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A B ST RACT. The Supreme Court has yet to adopt and apply a standard for assessing labor
rights claims under the Involuntary Servitude Clause. This Article suggests that one may be
found in the leading decision of Pollock v. Williams (1944), which contains the Court's most
thorough discussion of the interpretive issues. Under Pollock, a claimed right should be protected
if it is necessary to provide workers with the "power below" and employers the "incentive above"
to prevent "a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work." Although this is not the
only conceivable standard, it does fit well with the text, history, and case law of the Amendment.
The absence of any racial element, which might appear dishonest in light of the fact that most of
the leading cases involved workers of color, nevertheless corresponds to the Amendment's
original meaning and appears to have important advantages from a doctrinal point of view. The
Article discusses the legal and philosophical justifications of various labor rights in relation to the
Pollock standard, including the right to quit, the right to change employers, the right to name the
wages for which one is willing to work, and the right to strike.
A U T H O R. Professor of Law & Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law-
Newark. This Article is dedicated to the memory of C. Edwin Baker (1947-2009), long-time
friend and fellow Kentuckian. Ed's generosity of spirit, uncompromising integrity, and steady
faith in reason will be sorely missed.
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CONTRACT, RACE, AND FREEDOM OF LABOR
INTRODUCTION
Mayor Barrows-Dear Sir: -At a meeting of the colored Washerwomen
of this city, on the evening of the 18th ofJune, the subject of raising the wages
was considered... :
Be it resolved . . . , That on and after the foregoing date, we join in
charging a uniform rate for our labor..., and any one belonging to the class
of washerwomen, violating this, shall be liable to afine regulated by the class.
The prices charged are:
$1.50 per day for washing
$15.oo per month for family washing
$1o. oo per month for single individuals
We ask you to consider the matter in our behalf and should you deem it
just and right, your sanction of the movement will be gratefully received.
- Petition of the Colored Washerwomen
Jackson, Mississippi, June 20, 18661
Six months before the washerwomen of Jackson enacted their rule and
submitted their petition, Secretary of State William Seward certified the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Section 1 of the Amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." This text presents a unique interpretive problem. Nearly
everyone-from the Congress that proposed it down to the courts of today-
has agreed that it is a rights-granting provision.2 Yet it mentions no right.
1. 1 THE BLACK WORKER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
345 (Philip S. Foner & Ronald L. Lewis eds., 1978).
a. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,443-44 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 2954 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Kellogg) (finding in it "rights which are inalienable"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., ist Sess.
2990 (1864) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll) (finding "certain inalienable rights" including the
"right to till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and enjoy the rewards of his
own labor"); ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERiCAN FREEDOM:
A LEGAL HISTORY 44-46 (2004); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 41-42 (2006); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 893-99 (1986); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 475-504 (1989).
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Instead, it prohibits two conditions - slavery and involuntary servitude -
without specifying what rights are necessary to negate those conditions. It is
thus the one provision of the Constitution that clearly calls on courts and
Congress to identify and enforce unenumerated rights.' One of those rights,
the inalienable right to quit work, is so prominent in our constitutional
consciousness that it tends to overshadow other possibilities. But workers
have, with varying degrees of success, claimed a number of Thirteenth
Amendment labor rights, including the right to change employers, the right to
set wages (as opposed, for example, to wage setting by the state or an employer
cartel), the right to refrain from working altogether (in challenges to vagrancy
laws), the right to practice one's chosen trade (most prominently in cases
involving entertainers and professional athletes), the right to receive fair
wages, and the rights to organize and strike for higher wages and better
conditions, as in the petition of the colored washerwomen reprinted above.
4
The question then arises: what principle or principles can guide a
conscientious constitutionalist in determining whether a particular labor right
is implied by the ban on involuntary servitude? About a half century ago,
Harvard Law Professor and later Solicitor General Archibald Cox suggested
that a standard could be found in Justice Robert Jackson's opinion for the
Supreme Court in Pollock v. Williams.' In Pollock, the Court struck down a
Florida peonage law and set forth its most extensive justification for protecting
the inalienable right to quit work under the Thirteenth Amendment. "[I]n
general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or
treatment is the right to change employers," explained Justice Jackson's
opinion for a seven-member majority. "When the master can compel and the
3. Section 2 provides: "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, S 2. The Amendment does not mention judicial
enforcement, but section i outlaws slavery and involuntary servitude of its own force. Civil
Rights Cases, lo9 U.S. at 20, 23. By contrast, the Ninth Amendment-which makes clear the
existence of unenumerated rights -says nothing about any federal government role in their
identification or enforcement, arguably leaving those tasks to the states and the people of
the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
135-41 (1991) (reviewing the rights to organize and strike); RSA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST
PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 51, 69-70, 143, 155-57 (2007) (describing the rights to fair wages
and to refrain from work); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 285-89 (2001) (describing how the Amendment guarantees the
right to change employers); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley
Doctrine: Binding Men's Consciences and Women's Fidelity, ioi YALE L.J. 775 (1992) (deriving
the right to pursue a calling); VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 493-94 (discussing a right to set
wages).
S- 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
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laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to
redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome
conditions of work.",6 From this language, Cox concluded that the standard for
determining whether a given labor right is protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment hinges on whether the right is necessary to provide workers with
the "power below" and employers the "incentive above" to prevent "a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work."'
The courts have not embraced Cox's proposal. Nor have they adopted any
other standard for assessing labor rights claims under the Thirteenth
Amendment. The result is an area of law lacking consistent rationales for past
decisions or guideposts for the future. It is no exaggeration to say that
Thirteenth Amendment doctrine is "severely underdeveloped" and remains to
be "meaningfully translated into the present industrial context."
8
This Article reconsiders the text, history, and doctrine of the Thirteenth
Amendment with regard to the question of labor rights. It rejects the view,
expressed by the Supreme Court in 1872, that the words of the Amendment
"seem hardly to admit of construction, so vigorous is their expression."9 The
question of what constitutes "involuntary" or coerced action has long been a
subject of intense and inconclusive debate.1° Demonstrating the lack of
consensus, Congress recently went beyond the Supreme Court's definition,
criminalizing the extraction of labor by threats of "serious harm," physical or
nonphysical, to the victim or to other persons." Looking further back in time,
the leading sponsors of foundational labor rights statutes like the Norris-
LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act and the Wagner National Labor Relations Act
believed that economic coercion could bring about a condition of involuntary
servitude, and the statutes they promoted reflected that philosophy."2
6. Id. at18.
7. Id.; Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 576-77 (1951).
8. Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 973, 974 (2002).
9. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872).
1o. See, e.g., GERTRUDE EzORSKY, FREEDOM IN THE WORKPLACE? 5-14 (2007); STEINFELD, supra
note 4, at 1-26.
ii. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2o00, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000);
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943-44 (1988) (holding that the "involuntary
servitude" criminalized in federal statutes consisted only of physical and legal coercion);
United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3 d 145, 150-51 (1st Cir. 2004) (observing that the Act was
"intended expressly to counter United States v. Kozminski" and upholding a jury instruction
that defendants charged with violating it could be convicted based on nonphysical coercion),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005).
12. See infra Section VI.D.
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Consistent with their view, the Department of Justice maintained during the
1940S that the grossly substandard pay and conditions of African-American
agricultural laborers constituted evidence of involuntary servitude in violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment. 3 The term "servitude" has received less
attention, but, as discussed below, it too can be read in various ways, ranging
from a synonym for slavery to employment in general. 4 Then there is the
question of how the two words relate to one another. If servitude carries a
connotation of coercion (as it does in present-day dictionaries), then what does
the term "involuntary" add? Conversely, if servitude means employment in
general (as it did to some people in the 186os), then could it be said that most
Americans have no practical alternative but to enter into servitude?
This Article proposes that the Pollock standard should be adopted by courts,
legislators, and other interpreters of the Constitution. Part I examines the
origins of the standard in judicial opinions and congressional enactments
applying the ban on involuntary servitude. It challenges the notion, widespread
in our constitutional culture, that the inalienable right to quit arose
straightforwardly and obviously from the text and history of the Amendment.
To the contrary, that right prevailed only after a series of interpretive struggles
extending back more than two centuries to the time when the phrase
"involuntary servitude" first appeared in the Northwest Ordinance. The
outcome was in no sense foreordained; in fact, it was a very near thing. At each
stage, the proponents of the right to quit made the same, crucial interpretive
choices - choices that were eventually refined and summarized in Pollock.
Part II inquires into the role of race in Thirteenth Amendment labor rights
claims. The petition of the self-described "Colored Washerwomen" of Jackson,
reprinted above, raises concerns both of race and of labor rights. Likewise, the
Supreme Court cases that established the individual right to quit work all
involved black laborers. Although the Court proceeded as if the peonage laws
challenged in those cases had nothing whatever to do with race, everyone
involved was fully aware that they were enforced primarily against African-
Americans. From this, one might surmise that those decisions should be
viewed as race cases that would have come out differently had the laborers
involved been white. However, Part II suggests that the Pollock Court did not
err in holding that a Thirteenth Amendment labor rights violation can be
established without proof of a racial element. It proposes that race should play
a role in the analysis, but not as an element of the violation. Further, although
a full treatment of the relation between sex and labor rights is beyond the scope
13. GOLUBOFF, supra note 4, at 143-44.
14. See infra Section III.A.
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of this Article, Part II does suggest that sex might-at a minimum-play a
similar role to race in the analysis.
Part III presents the case for adopting the language of Pollock as a standard.
It assesses the fit of the language with the text, history, and case law of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Part IV takes a closer look at the standard, examining
its particular role in negating involuntary servitude, its workability, and the
division of labor between courts and Congress in its implementation.
Part V considers the legal and philosophical justifications for three
constitutional labor rights: to quit, to change employers, and to set wages. It
suggests that, in a nation of employees, these rights function not so much to
allow workers to escape servitude, as to enable them to transform it into
something better. If the labor market is functioning reasonably well, these
rights should give workers the "power below" to give employers the "incentive
above" to provide jobs that do not entail servitude. This leaves the question of
what happens if workers enjoy all of these market rights, but nevertheless have
no practical alternative but to accept servitude. Part V concludes that nothing
in either the Pollock standard or its philosophical foundations precludes the
possibility that nonmarket rights might be necessary to prevent servitude.
Part VI addresses the principal nonmarket labor rights that have been
claimed under the Thirteenth Amendment, which fall under the heading of the
worker's freedom of association. It suggests that -if we take the time to apply
ordinary methods of constitutional interpretation -the case for the Thirteenth
Amendment rights to organize and engage in concerted activity is compelling
on the merits. Although no court has recognized or enforced any such right
since the late 194os, the text, history, and judicial interpretation of the
Amendment do favor the claim-a fact that might help to account for the
otherwise surprising absence of any interpretive reasoning in judicial decisions
to the contrary. Part VI ends by considering the fit between associational rights
and the Amendment's objective of race equality.
I. ORIGINS OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO QUIT WORK
At first glance, the right to quit might seem to spring from the Amendment
without any need for interpretation. After all, if your employer can force you to
remain on the job, then you must literally be in a condition of "involuntary
servitude." Unfortunately for simplicity, however, indentured servitude and
peonage commonly arise from contractual agreement, and if a laborer
voluntarily enters into a contract for indentured servitude or peonage, then it is
hard to see how he or she could be in a condition of involuntary servitude. As
far as the text goes, then, there are two equally plausible interpretations.
According to one, servitude becomes involuntary the moment that a worker
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
wishes to cease work and is prevented from doing so. According to the other,
servitude is involuntary only if it is entered into involuntarily.
These two readings set two great freedoms against each other: freedom of
contract and, as labeled by the Supreme Court, the "freedom of labor."'" If the
laborer is granted the right to quit at any time, then she loses the freedom to
make a fully enforceable labor contract. But if she enjoys the right to make a
fully enforceable labor contract, then she could bargain away her freedom of
labor and find herself in a relation of abject submission to her employer.
The seriousness of this problem was clear from the outset. Senator Sumner
quoted a New Mexico military officer's opinion that "[p]eonage is voluntary
and not involuntary servitude," and that the Constitution "does not prohibit
it."' 6 Because of this difficulty, he proposed that an antipeonage bill be
developed by the Judiciary Committee, which had gained expertise on
constitutional questions in the course of drafting both the Thirteenth
Amendment and legislation to enforce it.'7 As enacted, however, the new
peonage law appeared to flaunt the constitutional problem by brazenly
prohibiting not only "involuntary service," but also the "voluntary ... service or
labor of any persons as peons.""
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the Supreme Court eventually
resolved this tension in favor of labor freedom and the right to quit. Contrary
to popular belief, however, there was nothing obvious or inevitable about this
outcome. Both of the competing readings found support in the text and history
of the Amendment. The Supreme Court leaned first one way and then the
other, finally making a forthright interpretive choice in favor of "the freedom
of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be based."' 9 The history of
this choice reveals much about the interpretive issues inherent in the text of the
Involuntary Servitude Clause, its original meaning (or meanings), and the
minimum requirements for a principled assessment of other claimed rights
under the Clause.
A. The Right To Quit Under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
Senator Sumner's fear that a ban on peonage might exceed the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment was well founded. The text of the Amendment was
is. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911).
16. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 240-41 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
17. Id.
18. Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546 (emphasis added).
19. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245.
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drawn directly from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.20 Proponents of this
wording pointed not to its substance, but to its provenance and familiarity.'
Senator Howard of Michigan, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
stressed that it had "been adjudicated upon repeatedly" and was "perfectly well
understood both by the public and by judicial tribunals."'
Unfortunately, however, the language was "perfectly well understood" to
produce two entirely opposite outcomes on the issue. Illinois famously rejected
the right to quit in favor of the freedom of contract. Early on, Governor
Harrison interpreted the Ordinance not to prohibit indentured servitude
(meaning bound service for a period of years enforceable by specific
performance), a view that was incorporated into territorial laws beginning in
1803, and in the Illinois State Constitution of 1818.23 The Illinois courts
maintained that even a long-term indenture entered into "voluntarily" and
"'without fraud or collusion"' was valid under the Ordinance.' This
interpretation could be defended on the ground that the Constitution included
persons "bound to Service for a Term of Years" in the category of "free
20. MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 56-57 (2001). The Ordinance provided: "There shall be
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the
punishment of crimes, whereof the parry shall have been duly convicted ... " Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, art. VI, Confederate Congress.
21. VORENBERG, supra note 20, at 56-57; Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial
History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L B.J. 26, 30-31 (1951).
22. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1489 (1864) (statement of Sen. Howard).
23. Hamilton, supra note 21, at 50-51. The Constitution of 1818 incorporated the Ordinance's
prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude and in the next sentence authorized
indentures. Id.
24. The quotation is from Justice Thomas's concurrence in Sarah, Alias Sarah Borders, a Woman
of Color v. Borders, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 341, 347 (1843) (Thomas, J., concurring). The indenture in
Sarah was for forty years. Strangely, none of the cases cited by historians for the existence of
the "Illinois rule" are on point. This is because the Illinois Supreme Court held that when
Congress accepted Illinois into the Union with its 1818 constitution approving involuntary
indentured servitude, the Ordinance was no longer binding on Illinois. Phoebe, a Woman of
Color v. Jay, I Ill. (Breese) 268, 272 (1828). In Phoebe, the court opined that an Illinois
territorial statute had been void under the Ordinance because it authorized indentures that
were not entered into voluntarily, but this was dictum because - according to the court- the
1818 constitution and its acceptance by Congress exempted Illinois from the Ordinance.
Whatever the strength of the case law, however, it was widely known that indentured
servitude thrived in Illinois despite the Northwest Ordinance both before and after 1818.
Hamilton, supra note 21, at 49-51. On the "llinois rule," see STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 259-
61. But see Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 2020, 2047-48 (2009) (arguing that the Illinois and Indiana approaches to the
interpretive issues regarding involuntary servitude were more similar than appears in
Steinfeld's account).
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Persons."" It permitted slave owners to convert their human property into
indentured servants by forming a "voluntary" contract. In 1818, Congress
admitted Illinois to the Union over objections that its constitution permitted
slavery, apparently approving the freedom-of-contract rule.26
Indiana took the opposite approach from Illinois and, in the process, set the
pattern for future justifications of the right to quit. In The Case of Mary Clark, a
Woman of Color, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a twenty-year contract of
indenture constituted "involuntary servitude" under the state constitution
(which incorporated the language of the Ordinance) even though the servant
had "voluntarily" consented to the contract. 7 The court framed the issue as
whether Clark's service, though "involuntary in fact" given her current desire
for freedom, was "voluntary by operation of law" because of her voluntary
assent to the indenture." Here, the court looked not to the validity of Clark's
consent, but to the social consequences of permitting a person to enter into a
long-term labor contract that could be enforced by specific performance.
Because such a contract "must be personally performed under the eye of the
master," such enforcement "would produce a state of servitude as degrading
and demoralizing in its consequences, as a state of absolute slavery; and if
enforced under a government like ours, which acknowledges a personal
equality, it would be productive of a state of feeling more discordant and
irritating than slavery itself."' 9 Permitting masters to enforce such contracts
through self-help (the actual issue in Mary Clark) would likewise injure the
"state of society" by producing "a state of domination in the one party, and
abject humiliation in the other."30 The gravamen of a violation, then, lay not in
25. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3. At the time the Constitution was enacted, white, as well as
black laborers could be "bound to Service for a Term of Years" by contract, for debt, or as
punishment for crime. RicHARD B. MoRRis, GovERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AmERcA
29-32 (1946).
26. Hamilton, supra note 21, at 51-52.
27. 1 Blackf. 122, 125-26 (Ind. 1821).
28. Id. at 123-24.
29. Id. at 124-25.
30. Id. at 125. It has been argued that Mary Clark did not equate specific performance with
involuntary servitude. Oman, supra note 24, at 2043-44. Because the actual issue in the case
involved self-help enforcement, and not specific performance, the decision arguably
contains no holding on the status of specific performance under the state constitution.
However, the court's decisive reasoning on the two issues is virtually identical. On specific
performance, the court cited the common law ban and then observed that "if the law were
silent, the policy... would settle this question." i Blackf. at 124. The court stated the policy
in terms that evoked constitutional concerns, as noted above. See supra text accompanying
note 29. Indeed there was no reason for the court to digress on the issue of specific
1484
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the presence or absence of individual consent, but in the relationship of
domination and subjugation.
When Congress began to consider proposals for a thirteenth amendment
banning slavery, the conflict between the Illinois rule favoring freedom of
contract and the Indiana rule favoring freedom of labor remained unresolved.
Only a few years before, in 186o, northern members of Congress had promoted
legislation to abolish criminal enforcement of labor contracts in New Mexico,
which embraced the Illinois rule in its state constitution.3' But southerners
replied that the situation in New Mexico was no worse than in "philanthropic
England" - or, for that matter, in the northern states themselves - and the bill
was defeated.32 By that time, the practice in the northern states conformed
generally to the Indiana rule, but there were few judicial opinions linking this
practice to the ban on slavery or involuntary servitude.33 In short, Senator
Howard's observation that the language of the Ordinance- soon to be that of
the Thirteenth Amendment-was "perfectly well understood both by the
public and by judicial tribunals" did not apply to the issue of the inalienable
right to quit.
B. The Right To Quit and the Peonage Act of 1867
There was scant discussion of the right to quit or any other specific labor
right in the congressional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment. A number
of outside commentators did suggest that peonage and West Indies-style
apprenticeship constituted "involuntary servitude," but their observations did
not bear on the clash between the freedom of contract and the freedom of
labor.' Given that both peonage and apprenticeship could be created
involuntarily as well as by contractual consent (peonage quite commonly,
apprenticeship generally), it is not at all clear that their mention implied an
endorsement of the Indiana rule.
performance except to support its ultimate conclusion "that the appellant is in a state of
involuntary servitude; and we are bound by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land,
to discharge her therefrom." i Blackf. at 126. The possibility that the same considerations
might not apply to relatively privileged workers is discussed infra text accompanying notes
191-198.
31. See STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 265.
32. H.R. REP. No. 36-508, at 32-33 (186o); STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 266.
33. STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 264.
34. JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE To WORK: LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND RECONSTRUCTION,
1815-188o, at 116 (1998).
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The clash between freedom of contract and freedom of labor resumed in
earnest shortly after ratification when the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which
included most of the senators and representatives who had proposed the
Thirteenth Amendment, debated and passed the Peonage Act of 1867."s
Congress was concerned primarily about debt peonage in the territory of New
Mexico, but the bill covered all U.S. territories and states. In a sharp departure
from the wording of the Thirteenth Amendment, it prohibited "the voluntary
or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons," thus clearly embracing
the Indiana rule .6 In opposition, Senator Davis of Kentucky argued-
consistently with the Illinois position -"that to the extent that [peonage] is
voluntary there is no necessity and no power on the part of Congress to
interfere with it."
'37
To the bill's proponents, however, what mattered was not whether the
laborer chose servitude, but whether the resulting condition was degrading to
workers and employers. Senator Doolittle freely admitted that in a system of
peonage, "the first thing the laborer desired to do was to get in debt to his
master, and get in debt as much as he could, and go and live with him."38 In
fact, some laborers had chosen to remain in servitude even after a federal court
in New Mexico declared peons to be free and entitled to writs of habeas corpus.
"Not knowing their rights, not being in a position to go into court to assert
their rights, or not having a desire to do so, [laborers] were generally remaining
in the families of their masters . . .3" The existence of freedom was to be
tested not by individual worker consent, but by whether freedom was
operating to produce fair conditions. The terms of debt service were, observed
Senator Buckalew, "always exceedingly unfavorable to" the laborer, and the
system "degrade[d] both the owner of the labor and the laborer himself."
'40
Senator Henry Wilson, the bill's strongest proponent, compared this
"wretched system" with the situation in the large towns of New Mexico, where
35. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1863) (reporting the senators present at the
Senate session that proposed and passed the proposed amendment), and CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1864) (reporting the respresentatives present at the House session that
passed the amendment), with CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1866) (reporting the
senators present at the Senate session that proposed and passed the Peonage Act of 1867),
and id. at 1-2 (reporting the representatives present at the House session that passed the
Act).
36. Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546 (emphasis added).
37. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867) (statement of Sen. Davis).
38. Id. at 1572 (statement of Sen. Doolittle).
39. Id. at 1571-72 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 1572 (statement of Sen. Buckalew).
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peonage had disappeared, "and peons who once worked for two or three
dollars a month are now able to command respectable wages, to support their
families, elevate themselves, and improve their condition." 41 The Act's
proponents thus reiterated the Mary Clark court's condemnation of domination
and degradation and added new, distributional concerns that would be echoed
in the future: exploitation and poverty.
C. The Right To Quit in the Supreme Court
The same clash of views played out in the Supreme Court.42 At first, the
Court leaned toward the Illinois view that servitude entered into voluntarily
could not be "involuntary servitude." In the 1897 case of Robertson v. Baldwin,
the Court upheld federal statutes making it a crime for seamen to quit their
jobs during the contract term, and directing federal marshals to arrest deserting
seamen and return them forcibly to their ships.43 The statutes' validity,
reasoned the Court, depended on the answer to the question:
Does the epithet "involuntary" attach to the word "servitude"
continuously, and make illegal any service which becomes involuntary
at any time during its existence [the Indiana rule], or does it attach only
at the inception of the servitude, and characterize it as unlawful because
unlawfully entered into [the Illinois rule]?'
Without directly stating an answer, the Court made clear its preference for the
Illinois rule on grounds both of policy and tradition. Under the Indiana rule,
"no one, not even a soldier, sailor, or apprentice, can surrender his liberty, even
for a day, and the soldier may desert his regiment upon the eve of battle, or the
sailor abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing, or even in a storm
at sea. ... " The Court noted that contracts "for a limited personal servitude
at one time were very common in England," and that it was a crime for
tradesmen or laborers to desert during the contract term. 46 The Court saw no
need for constitutional protection against such a rule because American "public
opinion" would not "tolerate a statute" that criminalized the breach of a
contract for personal service "except in the cases of soldiers, sailors and
41. Id. at 1571 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
42. See STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 270-85.
43. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
44. Id. at 28o.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 281.
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possibly some others." 47 Having said all this, the Court rendered it unnecessary
by holding that the Thirteenth Amendment "was not intended to introduce
any novel doctrine" concerning certain "exceptional" occupations that had
always been subject to specific performance, one of which was seafaring. 4s In
dissent, Justice Harlan vigorously attacked the majority's preference for the
Illinois rule, arguing that permitting a person voluntarily to enter into a
condition of servitude enforceable by law was no different from allowing him
to choose a condition of slavery.49 The majority's view, however, was no fluke.
At least one state court and one U.S. territorial court had upheld criminal
prosecutions against workers for quitting in violation of a labor contract."0
In Clyatt v. United States, decided in 1905, the Court reversed direction and
unanimously adopted the Indiana rule, but without any supporting
reasoning."' Six years later, Bailey v. Alabama filled that gap.52 The majority
opinion by Justice Charles Evans Hughes and the dissent by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes replayed the clash between the Indiana and Illinois rules one
final time. In order to circumvent state constitutional provisions barring
imprisonment for debt, southern states had made it a crime for a laborer to
obtain an advance on wages by means of a fraudulent promise of future labor.
Fraud was presumed from the breach of promise, and the laborer was barred
from rebutting the presumption with testimony "as to his uncommunicated
motives, purpose or intention."53 The majority found no relevant distinction
between this law and straightforward peonage:
What the State may not do directly it may not do indirectly. If it cannot
punish the servant as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve
without paying his debt, it is not permitted to accomplish the same
47. Id.
48. Id. at 282-83.
49. Id. at 300-01 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
So. See Hilo Sugar Co. v. Mioshi, 8 Haw. 201 (1891); STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 268-70 (citing
State v. Williams, io S.E. 876 (S.C. 1889)); see also CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE
ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 340-43 (2d ed. 19oo) (asserting
that the Thirteenth Amendment is not violated by the specific performance of term labor
contracts or by the criminal punishment of laborers for violating such contracts, and
providing examples of criminal statutes barring the breach of labor contracts in various
southern states).
51. 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).
52. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
53. Id. at 228 (quoting Bailey v. State, 49 So. 886, 886 (19o9)).
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result by creating a statutory presumption which upon proof of no
other fact exposes him to conviction and punishment.5 4
Like the Indiana Supreme Court and the congressional proponents of the
Peonage Act, the Bailey majority looked to the purposes of banning involuntary
servitude and the consequences of denying the right to quit. In addition to
abolishing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment was intended "to render
impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control
by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for
another's benefit which is the essence of involuntary servitude."5 The evil,
then, was to be found in the relation of control, and not in the presence or
absence of consent to be controlled. "There is no more important concern than
to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be
based," declared the Court, and if the Alabama law were allowed to stand, then
the legal protections for labor freedom "would soon become a barren form.,,
6
The Court did not restrict itself to applying the Peonage Act, but held instead
that the Alabama law violated both the Act and the Thirteenth Amendment
itself 7
In dissent, Oliver Wendell Holmes clung to the Illinois rule, insisting that
criminal punishment for breaching a "perfectly fair and proper contract" could
not constitute peonage or involuntary servitude., 8 "Breach of a legal contract
without excuse is wrong conduct, even if the contract is for labor," he
maintained, "and if a State adds to civil liability a criminal liability to fine, it
simply intensifies the legal motive for doing right, it does not make the laborer
a slave." 9 From fines to imprisonment was, for Holmes, an easy step. Surely,
he reasoned, the state could imprison a laborer for failing to pay a fine for
breach of contract. 6o
Bailey resolved the question of the right to quit in the world of legal
doctrine, but not of social practice. Southern states tested the Court's
commitment to the right to quit, some by openly defying Bailey and others by
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id. at 241.
56. Id. at 245.
57. Id.; see also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 142, 15o (1914) (striking down a state
statute making it a crime to breach a criminal surety contract under which one person,
usually a landowner, paid the fine of a convicted criminal, usually an agricultural laborer, in
exchange for a term of labor).
5S. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 247 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5g. Id. at 246.
6o. Id. at 246-47.
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circumventing the decision with more subtle legal mechanisms. 6 ' Not until the
1940s did the Supreme Court confront this resistance. In Taylor v. Georgia and
Pollock v. Williams, the Court struck down a Georgia statute and a Florida
statute that were similar to the one invalidated in Bailey.62 Justice Robert
Jackson's opinion for the Court in Pollock recounted the history of Florida's
resistance to Bailey63 and then explained the Court's determination to protect
the right to quit. "[I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay,
working conditions, or treatment is the right to change employers," wrote
Jackson.64
When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the
obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive
above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of
work. Resulting depression of working conditions and living standards
affects not only the laborer under the system, but every other with
whom his labor comes in competition.6 s
The Court acknowledged that there was "great" value in enforcing
contracts, but Congress had "put it beyond debate that no indebtedness
warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory service.",
66
Accordingly, the Florida statute was "null and void" both "by virtue of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage Act of the United States.
6
,
Pollock provides the clearest and most recent statement of the doctrine
announced in Mary Clark. The right to quit (extended to "the right to change
employers") is protected not because its presence or absence formally defines
the condition of involuntary servitude, but because it provides workers with a
necessary "defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or
61. See PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 19o1-1969, at 183-92
(1972); JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA'S UNDERCLASSES FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO THE PRESENT 107 (1992); Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive
Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 926-28 (1998).
62. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942).
63. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 11-13.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 25.
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treatment."68 Without it, there is no "power below" or "incentive above" to
curb domination or to promote wholesome conditions.6 9
D. Conclusion: Interpretive Choice and Involuntary Servitude
What can we learn from this history? First, the inalienable right to quit was
in no sense a natural or uncontroversial corollary to the abolition of slavery. It
was contested under the Northwest Ordinance, in the halls of Congress
immediately following the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification, and in the
courts until 1911. As late as 1897, three decades after ratification, it was
disapproved by a majority of the Supreme Court. 0
Second, the text of the Thirteenth Amendment contributed little to the
resolution of the question. Although there was a plausible reading that
"servitude" became "involuntary" the moment the laborer wished to quit work
and was prevented from doing so, there was an equally plausible reading that
"servitude" could not be "involuntary" if it was voluntarily contracted for.
Moreover, the prior interpretation of "involuntary servitude" under the
Northwest Ordinance revealed only an unresolved conflict between these two
readings, with Indiana favoring the right to quit while Illinois rejected it.
71
The third point follows from the first two. The status of the right to quit
today-as the only major, unenumerated constitutional right to win near-
universal approval - did not result from that right's being somehow obvious. It
resulted first from interpretive choices made by Congress and the courts, and
later from acceptance in the political culture at large.
Fourth, Bailey's conclusive recognition of the right to quit leaves us not
only with that result, but also with a more general resolution of the tension
between the freedom of contract and what the Bailey Court called the "freedom
of labor." It would be a mistake to view this as a head-to-head conflict ending
in a total victory for labor freedom. No one questioned the value of freedom of
contract in the abstract. But in order to choose between the two readings in
favor of the right to quit, courts and other interpreters had to reject the notion
that the Involuntary Servitude Clause guaranteed the freedom of contract and
nothing more, and accept the possibility that the freedom of contract could
conflict with the freedom of labor. Ultimately, the freedom of contract was
treated as a means to the end of ensuring labor freedom. The rights to quit and
68. Id. at 18.
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
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to change employers-each essential to the freedom of contract-were
protected not for that reason primarily, but because they aided workers in
avoiding employer tyranny and unwholesome conditions. When an exercise of
contractual freedom came into conflict with these objectives, it was the
contract - and not the freedom of labor - that gave way.
At each stage of the struggle, the proponents of labor freedom made the
same crucial interpretive choice. The Supreme Court of Indiana, the Congress
that passed the Peonage Act of 1867, and the Bailey Court all read the
Amendment not to guarantee a contractual procedure for the structuring of
employment relations, but to impose a substantive ban on relations of
domination and subjugation. Why protect laborers against their own free
choice? For one thing, it would be difficult to ascertain with confidence that
their choice was truly free; laborers might consent to servitude because they
did not know their rights, because they were not "in a position to go into court
to assert their rights," or even because they lacked the "desire to do so.72 For
another, laborers might need paternalistic protection; criminal punishment for
breach of a labor contract would be "peculiarly effective as against the poor and
the ignorant, its most likely victims.""3 More fundamentally, however, the
condition of involuntary servitude harmed not only the laborers themselves,
but also society as a whole. On this view, the point of the prohibition was not
to endow individuals with rights that could be traded away, but to prevent a
relation of domination and subjugation that would conflict with the health of
the Republic. Peonage "degrade [d] both the owner of the labor and the laborer
himself."74 Indentures injured the "state of society" by producing "a state of
domination in the one party, and abject humiliation in the other."" Such
domination did not fit "under a government like ours, which acknowledges a
personal equality."76 Regardless of the laborer's consent, a contract for forced
labor would damage "the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring
prosperity be based."77 A denial of the right to quit would drive down the
72. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571-72 (1867) (statement of Sen. Doolittle).
73. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911).
74. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572 (1867) (statement of Sen. Buckalew).
75. The Case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, 1 Blackf. 122, 124-25 (Ind. 1821).
76. Id.; cf Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 708 (E.D. Ark. 19o5) (stating that in passing the Peonage
Act, Congress had recognized that voluntary peonage might be even more dangerous to a
Republic than slavery, because "men of large wealth" might gain control over the votes of
"thousands of people").
77. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245.
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working conditions and living standards not only of the affected laborer, but
also of "every other with whom his labor comes in competition.78
II. RACE AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Conspicuously missing from the account so far is any mention of race. This
silence reflects the public position of the constitutional decisionmakers.
Although the leading cases from Mary Clark to Pollock all involved black
workers, judges either ignored the question of race or affirmatively denied that
it had anything to do with a determination of "involuntary servitude."
79
Meanwhile, in another line of cases, courts held that the Thirteenth
Amendment condemns racialized "badges and incidents of slavery" whether or
not they have any connection to involuntary servitude or to the extraction of
labor in general.s ° The effect has been to entrain Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence on two separate tracks, one for each of the Amendment's two
great thrusts: labor liberty and race equality.
8,
This split exists in sharp tension with social and legal-historical realities. As
many scholars have confirmed, the outcome of Bailey was - despite the Court's
denial-heavily influenced by considerations of race.s" Moreover, it is no secret
that the harshest forms of labor exploitation, for example chattel slavery and
peonage, are often reserved for members of subordinate, racially defined
groups. The question then arises: should the race/labor split give way to a
doctrine that is more sensitive to the intertwined dynamics of racial
subordination and the denial of labor rights? I propose that the answer is yes
and no; the doctrine should reflect the interconnection, but-perhaps
paradoxically- the result is to underscore the importance of protecting a
minimum floor of labor rights without regard to any provable racial element.
Race should be considered, but not as a required element of involuntary
78. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
79. See William M. Wiecek, Synoptic of United States Supreme Court Decisions Affecting the Rights
of African-Americans, 1873-1940, 4 BARRY L. REV. 21, 30 (2003); infra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
8o. Initially, the Court limited the Amendment's racial equality thrust to cases of forced labor.
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17 (19o6). Eventually, however, the Court overruled
Hodges and recognized a broad power in Congress "rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440
(1968).
si. On these two thrusts, see VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 495.
82. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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servitude. This conclusion holds, I believe, even if one values race equality over
labor liberty.
A. Race and the Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment Right To Quit
In the decisive case of Bailey v. Alabama, the Supreme Court asserted
famously that the Amendment was "a charter of universal civil freedom for all
persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the flag.''8 , Race, insisted the
Court, had nothing to do with the result: "We at once dismiss from
consideration the fact that the plaintiff in error is a black man .... The statute,
on its face, makes no racial discrimination, and the record fails to show its
existence in fact."
8 4
From the outset, however, the Court's claim of race-neutrality was greeted
with skepticism. In dissent, Oliver Wendell Holmes wondered how the
Alabama law could be considered harmful "except on a tacit assumption that
this law is not administered as it would be in New York, and that juries will act
with prejudice against the laboring man. ''8 , Viewed as a race-blind labor case,
Bailey appears anomalous. The labor jurisprudence of the time, epitomized by
such decisions as Lochner v. New York and Coppage v. Kansas, is remembered for
its devotion to the formal liberty of contract and its indifference to inequalities
of bargaining power between industrial workers and employers. By contrast,
Justice Hughes's opinion in Bailey exhibited a strong concern for the actual
impact of laws on agricultural laborers and a corresponding lack of concern
both for Bailey's contractual "consent" and for the employer's need for effective
contract enforcement.16 Race is the obvious explanation. While refusing to
hear coercion claims from industrial workers, the Lochner-era Court took a
more sensitive approach toward "groups it understood as weak," a category
including women and black peons, but not industrial workers. 7 Race went
83. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); see also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17
(19o6) ("Slavery or involuntary servitude of the Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon
are as much within its compass as slavery or involuntary servitude of the African.").
84. 219 U.S. at 231.
8S. 219 U.S. at 248 (Holmes, J., dissenting). On Holmes's view of the role of race in Bailey, see
Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 1O COLUM. L. REV. 351, 384-85 (2001); and
Klarman, supra note 61, at 923-24.
86. See Huq, supra note 85, at 382-83; Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The
Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
646, 702-03 (1982).
87. Huq, supra note 85, at 353, 386. On the Progressive Era Court's paternalistic treatment of
groups it considered weak, as compared to industrial workers, see FORBATH, supra note 4, at
52-53; STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 278; and Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and
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unmentioned for reasons both jurisprudential (a race-based holding would
have required a major doctrinal transformation) 88 and political (avoiding a
confrontation with the southern system of white supremacy).8 9
Assuming that race was relevant as a matter of history, then, there is a
disjuncture between Bailey's race-conscious origins and its enduringly race-
blind doctrinal product. 90 It has been suggested that "by ignoring the racial
dynamic at issue in the Peonage Cases the Court merely lost an opportunity to
explicate an additional dimension of the Thirteenth Amendment. '" 9' If so, then
the question is: what should the Court have done with this opportunity?
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 249,
255 (1987).
88. The Alabama law was race-neutral on its face, and it is unlikely that Bailey could have
prevailed under Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which held that a facially neutral law could be
overturned on racial grounds only by proving that it was administered with "an evil eye and
an unequal hand." 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). Although white peonage was relatively rare,
it was clear that the authorities-far from exempting whites as in Yick Wo-diligently
assisted employers in keeping white, as well as black, workers bound to labor. DANMEL, supra
note 61, at 82-1o9. Accordingly, Bailey's attorneys -backed by the United States-argued
not that the facially neutral law was administered in a discriminatory manner, but that it
was intended by the legislature "to give the large planters of the State absolute dominion over
the negro laborer." Schmidt, supra note 86, at 681. Had the Court accepted this claim, Bailey
would have transformed the law of racial discrimination. See Klarman, supra note 61, at
919-20 (noting that "the judicial battle against Jim Crow had little chance of success until
courts became willing either to undertake motive inquiries or to shift the constitutional
focus from purpose to effect").
89. Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor
Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1647 (1986) (noting that Bailey "paid homage" to the
Reconstruction-ending Hayes-Tilden Compromise, a major purpose of which was "to
remove the race issue from the national political agenda and to remit southern blacks to the
'care' of their former masters"); Klarman, supra note 61, at 925-27 (arguing that Bailey and
Reynolds "represent minimalist interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment -the very least
the Court could do short of acquiescing in southern nullification of the amendment");
Wiecek, supra note 79, at 30 (suggesting that the Court kept up the "pretense" that race had
nothing to do with the results in the peonage cases in order to avoid a confrontation with
the southern system of white supremacy).
go. The race-neutrality of the doctrine has been repeatedly confirmed in the near-century since
Bailey. In Pollock, three decades later, for example, the Court continued to eschew any
reliance on race. Not only did Justice Jackson fail to mention the possibility of
discrimination, but he also took pains to note that the U.S. Immigration Commission had
found that peonage existed in all but two states, and that "probably ... the most complete
system of peonage in the entire country" affected not black workers in the South, but
immigrant workers in the lumber camps of Maine. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 8-19
(1944).
gi. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil
Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1031 (2002).
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B. Should Racial Subordination Be an Element ofInvoluntaty Servitude?
Most obviously, the Court could have confirmed Holmes's suspicion that
the Alabama peonage law would have been upheld but for its racial aspect.
Under that approach, race would have become an element in the determination
of involuntary servitude. One system of peonage might have been invalidated
while another, identical to the first except for the absence of a legally
cognizable racial element, survived. For example, at the time of Bailey, peonage
thrived in the Maine lumber industry and in southern agriculture. 92 In Maine,
the workforce was composed mostly of recent European immigrants who had
been lured to remote lumber camps. This workforce could be thought of as
"racially defined" in the broad sense that its members were categorized as
"others" available for exploitation. 93 Almost a century later, however, the
courts have yet to accept such a broad notion of race, and it seems highly
unlikely that the Progressive Era Court could have recognized this
phenomenon as racial discrimination. If the Bailey Court had required a
finding of racial subordination to establish an involuntary servitude violation,
southern agricultural peonage would have been ruled unconstitutional while
peonage in the Maine lumber industry went untouched.
Such an outcome-determinative use of race finds no support in the text or
history of the Thirteenth Amendment. Although its immediate objective was to
abolish a particular, racialized form of labor oppression, the Amendment was
understood from the outset to include a race-blind component. It was said to
protect all "citizens, from the highest to the lowest, from the whitest to the
blackest, in the enjoyment of the great fundamental rights which belong to all
men." 94 As contemporary newspaper reports make clear, the protection of
those rights was understood to shield against race-neutral as well as
discriminatory forms of suppression.95 The concern of many Republicans for
92. S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 443, 447 (191o) (describing peonage in Maine); STEINFELD, supra
note 4, at 279 (detailing peonage in northern lumber and mining industries).
93. Wolff, supra note 8, at 1027 (describing the lumber workforce as "a racially defined, captive
workforce, tied by economic vulnerability and physical coercion" to the industry).
94. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson); JACOBUS
TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 168 (1965); TSESlS, supra note 2, at 44; William E. Forbath,
Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1, 27 (1999); Hamilton, supra note 21, at
34.
95. Kaczorowski, supra note 2, at 897 n.153 (presenting evidence from contemporary newspapers
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, was
understood to protect the fundamental rights of members of all races against suppression
whether the suppression was based on race or not). Although Congress eventually proposed
the Fourteenth Amendment as a way of ensuring that the Civil Rights Act would be upheld
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the rights of white laborers, as well as their endorsement of a broad free labor
vision encompassing people of all races, have been well documented.96 The
various evils of slavery that they deplored arose not specifically from the
racialized form, but more generally from relations of exploitation and
subjugation, leading to the creation of an arrogant aristocracy on the one hand,
and degraded labor on the other. 97 Less than two years after the ratification of
the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress exercised its enforcement power to
outlaw peonage with the immediate aim of liberating white peons in New
Mexico. Senator Henry Wilson, the bill's leading proponent, acknowledged
that it "applies not to negroes, but to white men," and explained that "while I
have been against negro slavery, I am also against slavery of this kind for white
men."
98
From our viewpoint today, there are at least four reasons to approve the
Bailey Court's refusal to require a showing of race discrimination or
subordination. First, as noted in the preceding paragraph, the text and history
of the Amendment strongly support it. Second, the denial of basic labor rights
often precedes and contributes to the formation of racial subordination. In
early colonial Virginia, for example, planters subverted both constitutional and
religious norms against enslavement as part of their project to reduce white
laborers to chattel bondage. "[W]hite servitude was the proving ground,"
summarizes historian Lerone Bennett, Jr. "The plantation pass system, the
slave trade, the sexual exploitation of servant women, the whipping post and
slave chain and branding iron, the overseer, the house servant, the Uncle Tom:
all these mechanisms were tried out and perfected first on white men and
women. " 9 9 Prior to Bacon's Rebellion of 1676, European indentured servants
by the courts, the Act was passed under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment, and
repassed by an overwhelming majority after Andrew Johnson vetoed it on constitutional
grounds and before the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. ERIc FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 244, 250-51 (1988).
96. ERIc FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 40-69 (1970); VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 442-43,445-48.
97. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., ist Sess. 2990 (1864) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll); id.
at 2984 (statement of Rep. Kelley); id. at 2979 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth); id. at 2955
(statement of Rep. Kellogg); id. at 2615 (statement of Rep. Morris); id. at 1459-6o
(statement of Sen. Henderson); id. at 1439 (statement of Sen. Harlan); id. at 1369
(statement of Sen. Clark); id. at 1313 (statement of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1202-03 (statement
of Sen. Wilson).
98. 76 CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867).
99. LERONE BENNETT, JR., THE SHAPING OF BLACK AMERICA 41 (1975); see also, 2 THEODORE W.
ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE: THE ORIGIN OF RACIAL OPPRESSION IN ANGLO-
AMERICA 124-47, 267-69 (1997) (documenting the harsh oppression of bond laborers both
before and after the arrival of Africans).
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and African slaves found considerable common ground as members of a
subjugated population, and it would have been difficult to distinguish
prejudice based on race from prejudice based on class."'0 But in that year, black
slaves joined with white indentured servants and rebelled under the leadership
of Nathaniel Bacon. Before the revolt was suppressed, Jamestown had been
torched. Having experienced the power of a cross-race, class-based revolt,
white planters resolved to establish a system of racial hierarchy, elevating even
the lowliest white person above the highest black person on the ladder of social
status.' By dividing white from black workers, the planters were able not only
to reinforce and intensify the subjugation of black labor, but also to deprive
southern white workers of basic rights that were enjoyed by northern white
workers. 2 This dynamic was very much on the minds of the Thirteenth
Amendment's Framers, who stressed the ill effects of slavery on white as well
as black labor.' 3
Third, without race-blind protection, many race-based violations of labor
rights would escape the law. Racial subordination is a complex and constantly
changing phenomenon that is difficult to define doctrinally and to prove in
particular cases. The status of a given group may shift based on a variety of
context-specific factors that can be hard to perceive both as to their existence in
fact and as to their significance in constructing racial identity. In the early
twentieth century, for example, Italians were considered white in some
contexts and nonwhite in others. "In Texas, the presence of thousands of
Mexicans helped make Italians white; in Canada, the absence of Mexicans or a
newer immigrant group ... helped keep Italians nonwhite.""0 4 The migration
of African-Americans and Mexicans northward during the 1920s and 1930s
made European immigrant workers seem less foreign and more "white" to
entrenched whites in the North.' °s Class position and economic circumstances
can shape, as well as reflect, racial categories. Transience, for example, was a
lmo. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 326-27 (1975); see also 2 ALLEN, supra note 99, at 148-62, 210-15 (documenting
solidarity among black and white bond laborers).
101. 2ALLEN, supra note 99, at 240, 250-53; MORGAN, supra note ioo, at 328.
1o,. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 25, at 482-99 (noting that in the southern colonies, masters
were given greater latitude to punish workers, often escaping conviction even for murder,
brutal torture, and rape).
103. VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 443-48.
104. GUNTHER PECK, REINVENTING FREE LABOR: PADRONES AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE
NORTH AMERICAN WEST, 188o-1930, at 169 (2000).
1o5. DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOwARD WHITENESS: How AMERICA'S IMMIGRANTS BECAME
WHITE: THE STRANGE JOURNEY FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO THE SUBURBS 149-55 (2005).
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"marker of nonwhiteness" in the American west around 1900.,o6 Similarly,
racial identity influences and is influenced by gender and sexual identity.
7
The difficulty of defining and proving race discrimination today is
compounded by international mobility in the context of "a complex and
transnational racial hierarchy involving 'blacks, Mexicans, Indians, Chinese,
Japanese, and other racialized groups.'''.°8 These complexities, together with
the general tendency for vulnerable groups to be channeled into the least
desirable jobs, suggest that courts would likely miss many instances of
racialized labor domination, especially during transitional periods or in
localities with demographics not reflected in a judge's particular experience.
Finally, it does not appear that race prejudice-as distinct from class
prejudice-is an essential component of slavery. The "'outsider status' of the
slave" could arise from any of a number of criteria including the simple
operation of law.'" 9 History is replete with examples of slavery existing within
ethnic groups and without any firm connection to racialized categories."'
When the Framers and Ratifiers of the Thirteenth Amendment insisted that it
protected all workers, and not just members of subjugated racial groups, they
prefigured the conclusion of scholars today "that limiting the idea of slavery to
106. PECK, supra note 104, at 166; see also ROEDIGER, supra note 105, at 37, 41, 43-44, 54, 66
(recounting the "interpellation of cultures of poverty with ideas about racial inheritance,"
including the origin of racist epithets like "guinea," "greaser," and "hunky" in economic as
well as biological concepts); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, The Construction of Race and Class
Buffers in the Structure of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731, 742-43 (1997)
(observing that European immigrants were transformed into whites "for the purpose of
having them function as a middle-tier buffer against a growing minority community of
surplus labor").
107. Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 132 (1994) (observing that the
"archaeology of race soon becomes the excavation of gender and sexual identity").
lo8. PECK, supra note 104, at 234-35. What appears to be a single racially defined group may turn
out, upon closer examination, to be riddled with complex, race-based cleavages that raise
serious problems for antidiscrimination law. Tanya Kateri Hernindez, Latino Inter-Ethnic
Employment Discrimination and the "Diversity" Defense, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259
(2007).
log. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 (1982).
11o. See A. Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavey and the Evolution of the Prohibition of
Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 303, 317-20
(1999) (citing PATTERSON, supra note lo9, at viii; and ERic WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM &
SLAVERY 4, 7, 29 (1994))-
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the prevailing Western concept of racial domination makes it more difficult to
identify and eradicate."11'
C. The Role of Race in the Constitutional Law of Involuntary Servitude
The rejection of a racial criterion for involuntary servitude does not
preclude decisionmakers from taking race into account in assessing particular
forms of labor subordination. The fact that a particular method of labor control
is imposed disproportionately on people of color raises a suspicion of
involuntary servitude. No doubt, the fact that southern peonage laws were
applied primarily to black people helped the Supreme Court to recognize the
oppressive and exploitative character of those laws. The Bailey Court could
have acknowledged this factor without requiring proof of racial subjugation as
an element of the violation. Similarly, Maria Ontiveros has pointed out that
decisions like Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, which strip
undocumented immigrant workers of effective remedies for labor rights
violations, disproportionately affect people of color." '2 Nevertheless, her
conclusion that the rule of Hoffman Plastic violates the Involuntary Servitude
Clause would, if implemented, protect undocumented workers of all colors."3
In addition to race, sex might play an important role in Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. The black washerwomen's petition reprinted at the
beginning of this Article, for example, raises issues of sex and gender as well as
race and labor freedom. The relation of sex to labor rights is complicated by the
ideology of separate spheres, the unpaid character of women's work in the
home, and the problem of uncompensated reproductive labor-all topics
beyond the scope of this Article. However, it seems that - at a minimum - sex
could play a role similar to that proposed here for race. Women, like members
m. See Amy Kathryn Brown, Note, Baghdad Bound: Forced Labor of Third-Country Nationals in
Iraq, 6o RUTGERS L. REV. 737, 741 n.23 (2008).
112. 535 U.S. 137, 142-43 (2002) (holding that when undocumented employees are discharged for
exercising their statutory right to organize a labor union, they may not be awarded back pay
as a remedy and that the employer need only post a notice promising not to repeat its
violations); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World-
Organizing Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 654 (2004).
113. Ontiveros, supra note 112, at 678-80; see also Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an
Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws,
36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 754-55 (2003) (contending that the denial of labor rights to
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of subordinate racially defined groups, often tend to be targeted for especially
harsh forms of labor control.1 4
On this view, workers of color and women could play a role in the
protection of labor freedom resembling that of the miner's canary; being the
most vulnerable, they are the most likely to be targeted for oppressive methods
of labor control. A disproportionate racial impact is one factor tending to
indicate undue interference with the freedom of labor, but not one that is either
necessary or sufficient. Once a particular method is recognized as a
constitutional violation, moreover, it is unconstitutional as applied to any
worker. This approach recalls to mind a famous observation made by Senator
Wilson, a leading proponent of the Thirteenth Amendment, that
we have advocated the rights of the black man because the black man
was the most oppressed type of the toiling men of this country.... The
same influences that go to keep down and crush down the rights of the
poor black man bear down and oppress the poor white laboring man."'
To sum up, there are good reasons to reject a requirement of race
discrimination or subordination as an element of "involuntary servitude." First
and foremost, neither the text nor the evidence of original meaning supports
any such requirement. The phrase "involuntary servitude" contains no hint of
race, and the Amendment's Framers proclaimed -without contradiction -that
it protected the members of all races and colors. Nor is there any reason to
regret these conclusions. The protection of labor rights contributes not only to
the Amendment's goal of protecting labor freedom, but also to its other central
purpose of abolishing race-based caste. Given the ever-changing and complex
nature of racial categories and hierarchies, a requirement of legally cognizable
race discrimination or subjugation would prevent effective enforcement in a
variety of contexts, for example (1) where labor oppression precedes
racialization; (2) where the subtleties of race formation make proof difficult;
(3) where the doctrinal definition of race fails to capture new forms that have
114. See, e.g., ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT To WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 142 (1982); VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 776-77. On the complexities of
the interaction between gender and labor subjugation, see, for example, CAROLE PATEMAN,
THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); Pamela D.
Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment's Role in the
Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401 (2000); Pamela D.
Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 7
WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 11 (2001); and Andrew Koppelman, Forced
Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense ofAbortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 48o (199o).
115. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 343 (1866); VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 44o.
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developed on the ground; and (4) where race is not an element of labor
oppression. On the other hand, there is no reason to follow the Bailey Court in
pretending that race is irrelevant. When a particular method of labor extraction
is applied disproportionately to groups defined by race, sex, or other criteria
that tend to indicate vulnerability, it should be scrutinized with special care." 6
III.A STANDARD FOR ASSESSING LABOR RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
In addition to the right to quit, various other labor rights have been
claimed under the Thirteenth Amendment, including the right to change
employers, the right to set one's wages (as opposed to wage setting by
government or employer cartels), the right to refrain from working altogether
(in challenges to vagrancy laws), the right to strike, and the right to organize
unions."1 Given that the text of the Amendment does not mention the right to
quit or any other right, the question arises: what principles can guide a
conscientious interpreter in determining whether a particular right is implied
by the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude? The term "involuntary
servitude" does not, by itself, supply the answer to these questions. As
recounted in Part I, not even the inalienable right to quit could be derived
without making interpretive choices. For guidance in resolving other labor
rights claims, then, it would seem that the obvious place to look is the Supreme
Court's handling of those choices.
Justice Robert Jackson's opinion for the Court in Pollock v. Williams
contains the Court's most extensive discussion of the issue. It suggests that the
standard for determining whether a given labor right is protected by the
Thirteenth Amendment hinges on whether the right is necessary to provide
workers with the "power below" and employers the "incentive above" to
prevent "a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work."... This
language closely tracks that of Bailey v. Alabama, which justified the right to
quit as necessary to prevent "that control by which the personal service of one
116. Even outright slavery is so thoroughly disguised that the intensity of scrutiny is highly
relevant. See, e.g., KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
26-28, 62-63, 84-85, 1o6-07, 137-38, 169, 237-38 (rev. ed. 2004) (reporting that many
enslaved people fail to protest or attempt escape because of social or religious norms, that
slavery is hidden behind fictive contracts, and that the actual owners may be distanced from
the slave by layers of subcontractors).
117. See supra note 4.
1n8. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); Cox, supra note 7, at 576-77.
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man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit."'1 9 Two central features of
involuntary servitude are to be negated: domination ("control," "harsh
overlordship") and exploitation (the disposal of one person's labor for
"another's benefit," "unwholesome conditions"). This dual focus echoes the
reasoning offered by proponents of the right to quit from the days of the
Northwest Ordinance forward.'20
The Court has thus far declined, however, to use Pollock as a standard for
assessing other rights claims. For example, the Court failed to apply Pollock -or
any other standard-to the labor movement's claim of a Thirteenth
Amendment right to strike. 2' Furthermore, the Court has provided no
explanation for its approach or, more accurately, lack of approach. This Part
assesses the fit of the Pollock principle with (A) the text of the Thirteenth
Amendment; (B) its early history; and (C) the case law.
A. The Pollock Principle and the Constitutional Text
If the Amendment were concerned solely with enabling workers to escape
servitude, then the Pollock principle's focus on preventing domination and
exploitation in the employment relation might appear misplaced. But the
prohibited condition of "involuntary servitude" may be negated in either of
two ways: (1) by rendering servitude "voluntary," or (2) by transforming
"servitude" into something else that is constitutionally acceptable. Pollock takes
the latter approach. The right to quit is justified not on the ground that it will
enable workers to escape servitude (thereby rendering servitude voluntary for
those who remain), but as the "defense against oppressive hours, pay, working
conditions, or treatment." By quitting or threatening to quit, workers can exert
a "power below" giving employers an "incentive above" to prevent "a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work."' Formulating this
reasoning in terms of the constitutional text, the right to quit provides the
"power below" and "incentive above" to prevent the employment relation from
sinking into "servitude."
This reading is neither confirmed nor excluded by the generally accepted
definitions of "servitude" as of the i86os, which, unfortunately for precision,
encompassed a wide range of usages. The term could be a synonym for slavery
119. 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
12o. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
121. See infra Section VI.A.
122. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 8.
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or-at the other end of the spectrum-for "service" in general."' A few
members of Congress did address the meaning of the term during the debates
over the Thirteenth Amendment, but in contradictory ways. One
representative quoted James Madison to the effect that servitude signified "the
condition of slaves," while service meant "the obligation of free persons." 4 We
can, however, safely reject this equation of servitude with slavery, both because
it would reduce the Involuntary Servitude Clause to a redundancy, and also
because it conflicts with the broader usage of courts and legislatures from the
early time of the Northwest Ordinance forward. 2 Another representative
opined that servitude would be present in all societies, but that "servitude
rendered necessary by circumstances which the servile party cannot control, is
bondage. ''I,6 This statement could be read to equate servitude with service. The
fact is, however, that the Framers were not interested in the particular
definitional problem that confronts us today. Direct references to the meaning
of servitude were few, far between, and contradictory.
123. See infra p. 1505, tbl.i.
12a4. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 19o (1864) (statement of Rep. Kasson).
125. As recounted above, in Part 1, courts and legislatures agreed that the clause extended beyond
chattel slavery to encompass, at a minimum, some forms of indentured servitude.
126. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1864) (statement of Rep. Ward).
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Table 1.
Contemporary Definitions of Slavery, Servitude, and Service
JOEP E. WOCSTR A NAH ESEANA EIA
DITONR OF THE ENLS DITONR OF THE ENLS
Slavery The state of absolute subjection to
the will of another; the condition of
a slave; servitude; bondage. (1352)
Servitude The state or condition of a servant,
or more commonly of a slave;
slavery; bondage. (1314)
Service The act of one who serves; labor or
duty performed for, or at the
command of, a superior. (1314)
The condition of a slave; the state of
entire subjection of one person to
the will of another. (1241)
The state of voluntary or
involuntary subjection to a master;
service; the condition of a slave;
slavery; bondage; hence, a state of
slavish dependence. (1207)
The act of serving; the occupation
of a servant; the performance of
labor for the benefit of another, or
at another's command; attendance
of an inferior, or hired helper, or
slave, &c., on a superior, employer,
master, or the like .... (12o6)
Over the past 150 years, the meaning of "servitude" has narrowed to one
that fits the Pollock standard snugly. The term now encompasses only relations
that involve a level of subordination inconsistent with citizenship in a
democracy. In addition to slavery, it signifies "bondage, subjugation,
subjection" and "domination," with an antonym of "liberty.1' 27 Thus, on the
view that the text should be read consistently with the average person's
present-day understanding, it supports Pollock's assumption that some
employment relations sink to the level of servitude while others do not.28
This "person-in-the-street" form of textualism has few supporters today
because it can alter the meaning of a constitutional provision based on
127. THE OXFORD AMERICAN WRITER'S THESAURUS 819 (2004); see also THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1650 (3d ed. 1992) (defining servitude as
"[a] state of subjection to an owner or a master," "[l]ack of personal freedom, as to act as
one chooses," and "[f]orced labor imposed as a punishment for crime"); MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/servitude
(last visited March 2, 20o8) (defining servitude as "a condition in which one lacks liberty
especially to determine one's course of action or way of life").
128. On this view, see PHILP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 4 (1991).
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linguistic changes unrelated to the purpose of the provision. The present-day
usage of "servitude," however, appears to reflect social change that is germane
to the Amendment's application. In the 186os, it was possible to equate
servitude with employment while, at the same time, believing that workers
could escape servitude. An industrious employee could reasonably expect to
become an independent farmer or artisan. 9 As long as the scale of industry
remained relatively small, Americans could cling to the traditional republican
tenet that economic independence was the necessary foundation of democratic
citizenship, and yeoman farmers and artisans-not servile employees-were
the backbone of the country.'3 °
In our present-day nation of employees, however, an equation of
"servitude" with employment would necessarily mean that the majority of
adult Americans are in servitude. Instead of the free labor system envisioned by
the Framers, in which a residuum of voluntary servitude existed as a way-
station to economic independence, we would have a servile labor system in
which most workers were in servitude with no realistic possibility of escape.13'
The narrowing of "servitude" to encompass only relations of domination and
degradation -with no connotation of employment in general- reflects the
modern view that employment need not descend to domination and
degradation if employees enjoy sufficient rights and protections. 3 Although
most employees can no longer escape employment, they can (in the language
of Pollock) prevent "a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work"
or (in the language of the Amendment) prevent employment from descending
into "servitude."
To summarize, the term "servitude" encompassed a wide range of
meanings during the 186os-some consistent with the Pollock principle and
some not. References during the debates were scattered and contradictory.
Over time, however, the meaning of the term narrowed to become consistent
with the Pollock principle. Today, "servitude" connotes a subset of employment
relations that involve a level of subjugation inconsistent with liberty. This
linguistic shift reflects the decline of self-employment as an escape from
129. See FONER, supra note 96, at 33. At that time, most Americans worked on farms, and the
average factory employed ten people. Ross M. ROBERTSON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 228 (1955); GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION
1815-i86o, at 247 (1951).
130. See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1850-1920, at 33-35
(1978); VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 471-74, 484.
131. For a discussion of this point, see infra Section V.D.
132. This change is also reflected in the abandonment of "master-servant" as the label for what
we now call labor and employment law.
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servitude, and thus appears to vindicate Pollock's approach of providing
employees with the rights necessary to prevent a harsh overlordship or
unwholesome conditions of work. '33
B. The Pollock Principle and the Early History of the Thirteenth Amendment
Under the Supreme Court's current approach to original meaning,
congressional actions following the ratification of a constitutional provision can
supply "contemporaneous and weighty evidence" of the provision's
meaning.' 4 Less than two years after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified,
Congress passed the Peonage Act of 1867 under its authority. The Act's
immediate target was peonage in the territory of New Mexico. During the
Congressional debates, proponents acknowledged that many laborers
voluntarily accepted peonage, and that some chose to remain in servitude even
though the U.S. District Court had ruled that they were free. Despite this
apparent consent, proponents condemned the system for producing terms
"always exceedingly unfavorable to" the laborer13 and claimed that its abolition
would enable laborers "to command respectable wages, to support their
families, elevate themselves, and improve their conditions. "136 Accordingly the
Act prohibited not only "involuntary" but also "voluntary" peonage. This focus
on the actual existence and consequences of subjugation, as opposed to its
voluntariness, fits well with Pollock's approach of judging any particular threat
to labor liberty (whether a peonage law, a vagrancy law, an antistrike law, or
something else as yet unanticipated) based on whether it deprives workers of
the "power below" and employers of the "incentive above" to avoid a "harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.
1 37
Congressional discussions of the rights of freed people to change employers
and set their own wages proceeded along similar lines. Southern planters were
attempting to subjugate their former slaves through a variety of measures that
did not involve physical or legal coercion to work. Reports of the planters'
tactics came before Congress, and lively debates ensued about whether they fell
133. On the decline of self-employment, see infra Section V.A.
134. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
723-24 (1986)); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409, 423-39 (1968) (drawing
on the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as an aid to interpreting the
Thirteenth Amendment).
135. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572 (1867) (statement of Sen. Buckalew).
136. Id. at 1571 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
137. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
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within its proscription.' Under the rule of entireties, for example, a worker
who quit during the term of her contract (typically one year) would forfeit all
earnings accrued to that point. 39 Although the worker had consented to the
contract, and the rule involved only economic coercion, Republicans in
Congress denounced it for placing the employee "at the control and will" of the
employer.' 4 Other measures, including tort actions for "enticing" laborers
away from their employers and the setting of wages by state legislatures or
employer associations, were similarly censured.' 4' It has been argued that-
instead of condemning each of these mechanisms per se-the Republican
majority opposed them only in the context of "the brutal conditions of New
Mexican peonage or the Reconstruction south. '142 No doubt, those contexts
provided both the impetus and the vivid exposures necessary to generate
Congressional opposition, but the resulting denunciations ran against each
mechanism in particular. When Congress outlawed a practice, as in the
Peonage Act of 1867 or the Padrone statute of 1874, the prohibition extended
throughout the nation without regard to any particular context of racism or
violence. 143
The majority's expansive notions of labor freedom did not go
unchallenged. Edgar Cowan, a conservative Republican senator from
Pennsylvania, vocally insisted that the Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed
nothing more than physical liberty. He argued that the whole purpose of the
Amendment was "simply to abolish negro slavery," and that only one right was
required to accomplish that purpose: "[t]he right to go wherever one pleases
without restraint or hinderance on the part of any other person." 4" Cowan
138. See VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 453-54, 475-76. For additional discussion of the Pollock
principle's fit with the original meaning, see infra text accompanying notes 185-186.
139. STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 291-92.
140. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 34o (1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson); VanderVelde,
supra note 2, at 492-93.
141. VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 491, 493-94.
142. Oman, supra note 24, at 2071.
143. The Padrone statute was enacted to prevent the importation of Italian children for forced
labor in the United States, but the terms of the prohibition were general and contained no
reference to the particular context. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 947 (1988)
(quoting the Congressional Record and the Padrone statute, Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 464. 18
Stat. 251). On the Peonage Act, see supra Section I.B.
144. VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 478 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1789
(1866)). Cowan's argument echoed those of moral abolitionists, who insisted that a laborer
who "is under no physical coercion ... thus escapes essential and perpetual degradation."
NORTHERN LABOR AND ANTISLAVERY: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 131 (Philip S. Foner &
Herbert Shapiro eds., 1994) (quoting an antislavery newspaper).
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engaged in a running battle with the Radical Republicans culminating in a
dramatic showdown over a proposed extension of the Freedmen's Bureau bill.
Cowan charged that under the Radicals' egalitarian approach, there would be
no one to perform "the menial offices of the world," like blacking boots and
currying horses, and if such tasks "were not done I should like to know how we
could live at all.' 45 In response, Senator Henry Wilson, who would later
sponsor the Peonage bill, declared:
The Senator knows what we believe. He knows that we have
advocated the rights of the black man because the black man was the
most oppressed type of the toiling men of this country....
The Senator tells us that if all men were equal and all men were
learned, we could not get our boots blacked.... [That] has been the
language of the negro drivers in this country for sixty years-of the
men who had just as much contempt for the toiling white millions of
the country as they had for their own black slaves.
146
After this debate, Cowan's influence waned. He continued to speak out, but
the Republican leaders rarely deigned to respond. His narrow view of the
Amendment was repeatedly outvoted, and he was effectively isolated on issues
relating to freed persons.' 47
In short, the Pollock principle echoes Congress's approach to the application
of the Thirteenth Amendment in the period immediately following ratification.
Rejecting arguments that the Amendment protected only physical liberty,
Congress assessed each mechanism of employer control in terms of its likely
effect on the levels of domination and exploitation in the employment relation.
Although it might be possible to formulate other principles that fit the original
understanding, the fact that the one chosen by the Supreme Court satisfies that
criterion would seem to place the burden on its opponents to come forward
with a superior alternative.
C. The Pollock Principle and the Case Law
The Pollock principle identifies rights that are necessary to enable workers
to avoid servitude, and not solely rights that, by their absence, define the
condition of "involuntary servitude." In Shaw v. Fisher, for example, the South
145. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan).
146. VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 481-82 (quoting id. at 343).
147. Id. at 482-83. For additional discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes
185-186.
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Carolina Supreme Court invalidated the tort of hiring a laborer who was under
a contractual obligation to work for another, even though there was no finding
that the particular laborer involved could not have left the state or worked with
family members. 14 Similarly, the Pollock Court did not inquire as to the
harshness of domination or unwholesomeness of conditions faced by the
laborers involved. Involuntary servitude was to be eliminated not solely by
defining and outlawing that condition itself, but also by giving laborers the
"power below" to give employers the "incentive above" to relieve harsh
domination and unwholesome conditions.
1 49
The Supreme Court's 1988 decision in United States v. Kozminski is often
cited to support a narrower, definitional approach to involuntary servitude. In
Kozminski, several defendants were convicted of subjecting two mentally
impaired men to involuntary servitude in violation of two federal statutes that
incorporated the ban on involuntary servitude.' The convictions rested partly
on the ground that the defendants had inflicted psychological coercion-
including withholding pay, providing inadequate nutrition and shelter, and
isolating the two men from outside contact -to convince them that they could
not quit.' The Court held that the "involuntary servitude" prohibited by the
criminal statutes encompassed only physical and legal coercion, and not
psychological coercion.' 2 Instead of applying the Pollock approach, which
would have asked whether freedom from the kind of psychological coercion
inflicted in Kozminski was necessary to avoid involuntary servitude, the Court
determined simply that the ban on involuntary servitude had "never been
interpreted specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor" by means other than
physical or legal coercion.5 3
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court made it clear, however, that this
narrow reading resulted from special constraints on the interpretation of
criminal statutes and did not limit the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
itself: "By construing § 241 and § 1584 to prohibit only compulsion of services
through physical or legal coercion, we adhere to the time-honored interpretive
guideline that uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
148. Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 327 (S.C. 1920) (discussed infra text accompanying notes
231-232).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
1SO. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
1s5. Id. at 935-36.
IS2. Id. at 943-44. Bailey and Pollock were distinguished on that ground.
153. 487 U.S. at 944.
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resolved in favor of lenity."' Although this statement seems clear enough, the
relationship between the constitutional and statutory concepts of involuntary
servitude is sufficiently complicated that the case has often been mistakenly
cited for the proposition that the constitutional concept includes only physical
or legal coercion. Accordingly, it will be necessary to discuss Kozminski in some
detail. The first of the two statutes at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 241, forbids
conspiracies to interfere with rights secured "by the Constitution or laws of the
United States."' In the words of the Court, this language "incorporates the
prohibition of involuntary servitude contained in the Thirteenth
Amendment."l"6  However, the statutory context alters the mode of
interpretation:
Congress intended the statute to incorporate by reference a large body
of potentially evolving federal law. This Court recognized, however,
that a statute prescribing criminal punishment must be interpreted in a
manner that provides a definite standard of guilt. The Court resolved
the tension between these two propositions by construing § 241 to
prohibit only intentional interference with rights made specific either
by the express terms of the Federal Constitution or laws or by decisions
interpreting them." 7
At the time of Kozminski, Congress had yet to enact a statute that, by its
express terms, recognized a right to be free from forms of labor control other
than physical or legal compulsion. As for judicial decisions, the Court
conducted a review of previous Supreme Court decisions and concluded that
the Involuntary Servitude Clause had "never been interpreted specifically to
prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological
coercion."' ' 8 That historical fact, however, limited the scope of "involuntary
servitude" only in the context of a criminal statute:
We draw no conclusions from this historical survey about the potential
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment. Viewing the Amendment,
however, through the narrow window that is appropriate in applying 5 241,
it is clear that the Government cannot prove a conspiracy to violate
154. Id. at 952.
155. Id. at 940 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 241).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 941.
158. Id. at 944. Some state courts have interpreted it to prohibit some economic coercion. See
infra Section V.B.
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rights secured by the Thirteenth Amendment without proving that the
conspiracy involved the use or threatened use of physical or legal
coercion.5 9
The second of the two statutes involved in Kozminski, 18 U.S.C. § 1584,
mandates the criminal punishment of "[w]hoever knowingly and willfully
holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary
servitude any other person for any term." After noting that the phrase
"involuntary servitude" had been drawn from the Thirteenth Amendment and
inserted in a statute enacted to enforce it, the Court concluded that Congress
"intended the phrase to have the same meaning in both places." 6' However,
that identity of meaning existed only at the moment of the statute's enactment
in 1948. "At that time, all of the Court's decisions identifying conditions of
involuntary servitude had involved compulsion of services through the use or
threatened use of physical or legal coercion." Accordingly, "[b]y employing the
constitutional language, Congress apparently was focusing on the prohibition
of comparable conditions." 6' Thus, the scope of the statutory phrase, but not
the constitutional one, was limited to forms of labor control that had already
been adjudicated as of 1948. "Congress chose to use the language of the
Thirteenth Amendment in § 1584 and this was the scope of that constitutional
provision at the time 5 1584 was enacted. ,162 From that moment forward, there
would be nothing to stop the constitutional applications from expanding as
new forms of labor control were brought before the Court.
It might be argued that if Congress intended the phrase involuntary
servitude "to have the same meaning in both" the statute and the Constitution,
then-if Pollock accurately stated the Amendment's meaning-that meaning
would have been incorporated into the statute. 61 But the Court's notion of
"meaning" was a technical one shaped by the criminal statutory context.
Instead of looking to any abstract definition or explication of "involuntary
servitude" - whether broad or narrow-the Court limited its statutory
"meaning" to forms of labor control that had already been. challenged and
adjudicated. Section 24i did not criminalize psychological coercion because,
"[l]ooking behind the broad statements of purpose to the actual holdings, we
find that in every case in which this Court has found a condition of involuntary
159. 487 U.S. at 944 (emphasis added).
16o. Id. at 944-45.
161. Id. at 945.
162. Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
163. Pollock was decided in 1944; the statute was reenacted in 1948.
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servitude, the victim had no available choice but to work or be subject to legal
sanction. ''164 The Court reached the same conclusion with regard to § 1584
because, at the time of its enactment, "all of the Court's decisions identifying
conditions of involuntary servitude had involved compulsion of services
through the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. '  Only
specific holdings-and not "amorphous definitions" - could provide the
certainty required by the principle of lenity.
166
The Kozminski Court, then, never reached the question of whether
psychological coercion was encompassed within the constitutional term
"involuntary servitude." It held only that a statute criminalizing involuntary
servitude will be read to prohibit exclusively activities that -at the time of the
offense in the case of§ 241, and at the date of enactment in the case of§ 1584-
were already expressly encompassed within the constitutional term as
evidenced by specific statutory language or Supreme Court holdings. Since the
Court had never addressed a claim of psychological coercion, no such holding
existed. As Justice O'Connor explained, the Court drew "no conclusions from
this historical survey about the potential scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment.',,6, Congress subsequently broadened the scope of involuntary
servitude to include nonphysical forms of coercion, so far without objection
from the courts. 6 " Kozminski leaves the Pollock standard intact.
Butler v. Perry is also cited as a limitation on the Amendment's scope. In
Butler, the Court stated that "the term involuntary servitude was intended to
cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in
practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results. '69 This
language echoes the Court's earlier observation that the "obvious purpose" of
164. 487 U.S. at 942-43.
165. Id. at 945.
166. Id. at 951-52. Thus, the Court rejected Justice Brennan's argument that the statute should be
interpreted as banning all forms of coercion that effectively placed workers in "a slavelike
condition of servitude," id. at 964 (Brennan, J., concurring), not on the merits of the
standard (to the contrary, the Court agreed that "Congress intended to prohibit 'slavelike'
conditions of servitude," id. at 951 (majority opinion)), but because such a standard "would
delegate to prosecutors and juries the task of determining what working conditions are so
oppressive as to amount to involuntary servitude." Id. at 950.
167. Id. at 944; see also id. at 952 ("Absent change by Congress, we hold that, for purposes of
criminal prosecution under § 241 or § 1584, the term 'involuntary servitude' necessarily
means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by
the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion
through law or the legal process." (emphasis added)).
168. See sources cited supra note 11; sources cited infra note 215.
169. Butler v. Perry, 24o U.S. 328, 332 (1916).
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the clause was to "forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery," for
example long-term apprenticeships, serfdom, or "Mexican peonage or the
Chinese coolie labor system."'7z Butler could be read to limit the term
"involuntary servitude" to relations that share particular features with chattel
slavery, Mexican peonage, or other forms of labor exploitation that existed in
the 186os. Some judges have suggested that involuntary servitude must be akin
to slavery in the specific sense of subjecting workers to physical or legal
coercion. 171 Such a reading would conflict with the approach of Bailey and
Pollock, which is concerned with the actual ability of workers to protect
themselves against harsh domination and unwholesome conditions, and not
with the presence or absence of particular, nineteenth-century mechanisms of
control.
It would also conflict with the Court's usual approach to rights-granting
provisions, which applies general principles to present-day conditions rather
than pickling historical applications. The Court could have held, for example,
that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth protected only against the particular historical evils
they were intended to eliminate-prior restraints on speech and de jure race
discrimination in the area of civil, but not social or political, rights. Instead,
however, the Court took seriously the broad wording of those provisions, and
approached them as a source of principles, not as a freeze-frame ban on
particular historical practices. As a result, the Free Speech Clause protects
against punishment of speech as well as prior restraint, and the Equal
Protection Clause addresses non-de jure intentional discrimination pertaining
to social and political as well as civil rights. 72 Consistently with this approach,
Congress has extended the Involuntary Servitude Clause beyond physical or
legal coercion to include psychological coercion-so far with judicial
approval.' 73 Just as the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments encompass
modern forms of communication, weaponry, and search, 74 so should the
Thirteenth extend to modern forms of labor control and labor activity.
Moreover, Butler is generally read to require that involuntary servitude be
"akin to African slavery" at a higher level of abstraction. 7s It has been applied
170. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69, 72 (1872).
171. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 18o-81 (4th Cir.
1996); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.).
172. For more on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 361-362.
173. See sources cited supra note 11; sources cited infra note 215.
174. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791-92 (2008).
175. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916).
119:1474 2010
CONTRACT, RACE, AND FREEDOM OF LABOR
mainly to the question of what kinds of relationships other than private
employment (the Amendment's core concern) are covered by the clause, and
the results have been consistent with Bailey and Pollock. In Butler itself, the
Court upheld a state law making every able-bodied male liable to be drafted for
six days each year to work on public roads. The Amendment, explained the
Court, "certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties
which individuals owe to the State, such as services in the army, militia, on the
jury, etc.176 The Court could have relied on the text of the Amendment, which
does not prohibit forced labor in general, but a particular kind of involuntary
labor relation, namely "servitude." Unlike civic duties, which are performed
under the direction of representative government for the benefit of the people,
"servitude" typically involves work performed under the direction of a master
for the benefit of the master. 177 Butler has also been applied in other contexts
where service is performed not for the benefit of a master, but for other
purposes including, for example, education, therapy, or religiosity. In such
cases, the inquiry centers on the authenticity and importance of the
nonexploitative purpose, and whether the Amendment's concern with
subjugation is raised on the facts.zs Whether the challenged relations are
sufficiently "akin to African slavery" thus depends on the presence or absence
176. Id. at 333.
177. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (distinguishing involuntary
servitude from "the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his
supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation,
as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people"); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (referring to "that control by which the personal service of
one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit" as "the essence of involuntary
servitude"); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 19 (19o6) (defining "servitude" as "'the
state of voluntary or compulsory subjection to a master"') (quoting WEBSTER'S DIcTIONARv
(19o)); see also Koppelman, supra note 114, at 521 n.176 (noting the distinction between
involuntary servitude and "honorable public duties"); supra p. 1505, tbl. 1.
178. See, e.g., Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3 d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a
community service requirement for high school graduation after determining that its
purpose was "educational" and "not exploitative"); United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276,
1z81 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction of religious cult leaders for compelling children
to work where "force was utilized by the defendants to compel extra services from the
children that accrued to defendants' personal benefit"); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132
(2d Cir. 1966) (sending mental patient's claim of involuntary servitude to trial on the
ground that a program of mandatory chores for mental patients might be "so ruthless in the
amount of work demanded, and in the conditions under which the work must be
performed, and thus so devoid of therapeutic purpose, that a court justifiably could [find]
involuntary servitude"). For other examples, see Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky
Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of a Doctrine, 8o CORNELL L. REv. 372, 395
(1995).
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of exploitation and subjugation -not of specific, nineteenth-century methods
of labor control.
Within the employment context, then, the Bailey/Pollock standard specifies
the kind of employment relation that is "akin to African slavery" and produces
"like undesirable results." On their facts, Bailey and Pollock do not go beyond
the line of physical or legal coercion. However, the principle of those cases
condemns all forms of power that effectively eliminate the workers' "power
below" and the employers' "incentive above" to avoid a harsh overlordship or
unwholesome conditions of work. Viewing the case law as a whole, it would
seem that the standard should be applied in future cases unless it is
unworkable or imprudent.
IV.A CLOSER LOOK AT THE POLLOCK PRINCIPLE
For the reader who is persuaded that the Pollock principle warrants serious
consideration, questions arise as to its workability and likely consequences.
This Part examines (A) the particular role of the Pollock principle in negating
involuntary servitude, (B) the workability of the principle as a standard for
assessing labor rights claims, and (C) prudential, problems arising from the
principle.
A. The Role of the Pollock Principle in Negating Involuntary Servitude
The project of negating a condition, here slavery or involuntary servitude,
entails basic choices about objectives. Lea VanderVelde offers an illuminating
formulation. Is the goal accomplished, she asks, when the condition is
"obliterated into nothingness, like eliminating a spot on an otherwise pure
fabric, or vanquishing a travesty?" Or would that approach defeat the purpose
by creating "a vacuum into which other forms of exploitation and oppression
could flow" ?'7' The cases on involuntary servitude exhibit two contrasting
approaches to labor rights claims, each of which reflects a distinct set of
answers to these questions. One is the definitional approach deployed in
Kozminski and other decisions applying statutory bans on "involuntary
servitude." This approach seeks to eliminate the travesty of involuntary
servitude as if it were a spot on an otherwise pure fabric. It protects only those
rights that, by their absence, define the condition of involuntary servitude. It
asks whether, without the claimed right, the individual laborer would be in the
179. Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855 ,
875-76 (2007).
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prohibited condition of "involuntary servitude." If so, then the right is
protected. On this view, the inalienable right to quit can be explained as
negating the "involuntary" element of involuntary servitude. This definitional
approach provides the irreducible minimum of constitutional protection. At the
very least, the constitutional command that slavery and involuntary servitude
"not exist" must guarantee the right to be free from those conditions.
Pollock adds a second, functional approach to labor rights claims. Here,
involuntary servitude is seen not as a spot on an otherwise pure fabric, but as a
system of unfree labor locked in struggle with the system of free labor. The
negative goal of obliterating involuntary servitude is intertwined with the
positive goal of "maintain[ing] a system of completely free and voluntary labor
throughout the United States. " s' The Thirteenth Amendment guarantees a
given right not only if its absence ipso facto defines the prohibited condition of
involuntary servitude, but also if it is essential to the functioning of the free
labor system.
Where the definitional approach seeks to enforce directly each individual's
freedom from involuntary servitude, the functional approach protects workers'
rights to participate in the free labor system, which, in turn, operates to
prevent involuntary servitude. Within the employment relation, the
Amendment protects all rights necessary to provide workers with the "power
below" and employers with the "incentive above" to remedy "a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work." The workers' power and
the employers' incentive are generated not at the individual level, between a
particular laborer and employer, but in the aggregate, through the workings of
the free labor system. This is apparent in Justice Jackson's formulation of the
right at issue: not simply as the right to quit (which, given that the law
challenged in Pollock criminalized quitting, might have been the more natural
framing), but as "the right to change employers."' 8' By the time that an
individual laborer has exercised this right, she is working for another employer
and cannot benefit directly from whatever influence her "power below" might
have exerted on her previous employer. Systemically, however, each worker's
exercise of the right operates to ensure that employers who seek to impose
harsh domination and unwholesome conditions will be punished with high
employee turnover, while those who offer better terms will be rewarded with
loyalty. Even if the particular rights claimant is not in imminent danger of
iso. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944); see also Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245 (noting the
Amendment's purpose to "safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring
prosperity be based"). For similar statements by the Amendment's Framers, see infra note
185.
181. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 17-18.
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involuntary servitude, the right may be protected as "in general" necessary to
provide workers with an effective "defense against oppressive hours, pay,
working conditions, or treatment.",,8
Consider, for example, Shaw v. Fisher, a case that- unlike Pollock - actually
did involve a constraint on the right to change employers. In Shaw, a
sharecropper named Carver broke his contract with Shaw, and subsequently
found employment with Fisher."3 Shaw sued Fisher for the common law tort
of harboring a worker who had quit another employer in breach of contract.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment had
"annulled" the tort, even though Carver was free to quit and there was nothing
in the opinion to indicate that he lacked alternative means of supporting
himself, for example by working with family members, going into business for
himself, or migrating outside the state.'14 Apparently, Carver's freedom to
participate in the free labor system was at stake.
This functional approach echoed the proceedings and legislative
enactments of the Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth Congresses, which
proposed the Thirteenth Amendment and shaped its early enforcement.
Senators and representatives stressed that the Amendment would protect the
freedom of labor, including a set of rights extending far beyond those that
defined the conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude. Among those
mentioned, for example, were the rights to "enjoy the rewards of his own
labor," to "name the wages for which he will work," and to change
employers."Ss The Peonage Act of 1867 prohibited "voluntary" as well as
182. Id. at 18.
183. Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 326 (S.C. 1920); see infTa text accompanying notes 231-232.
184. Id. at 326-27. The court drew on Bailey, quoting its admonition that the purpose of the
Amendment was to "render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free .... " Id. at
326 (quoting Bailey, 219 U.S. at 241).
185. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 116o (1866) (statement of Sen. Windom); id. at 111 (statement
of Sen. Wilson) (discussing freedman's right to "work when and for whom he pleases");
VORENBERG, supra note 20, at 235 (observing that the Amendment was intended to protect
natural rights, and that the "right to the fruit of one's labor was the natural right most
commonly mentioned"). For general statements concerning the purpose of the Amendment
not merely to abolish slavery, but to establish freedom, see, for example, CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2985 (1864) (statement of Rep. Kelley) ("Let us establish freedom as a
permanent institution, and make it universal."); id. at 2983 (statement of Rep. Mallory)
(complaining that proponents of the Amendment seek to supplant slavery by the "system of
free labor"); id. at 2944 (statement of Rep. Higby) (observing that passage of the
Amendment represents the choice between slavery and "free institutions and free labor"); id.
at 2615 (statement of Rep. Morris) (advocating passage of the Thirteenth Amendment on
the ground that "this is not a mere struggle between the North and the South; it is a conflict
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involuntary peonage, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected a broad array
of freedoms against race-based (and, in the popular understanding,
race-neutral) infringements, including the rights "to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,




The Pollock approach reflects the unique character of the Thirteenth
Amendment as a rights guarantee that specifies no rights. With regard to an
enumerated right-like the right to bear arms or to speak freely-judges and
legislators might reasonably consider their job done once individuals possess
an enforceable legal entitlement to exercise the right. But Thirteenth
Amendment rights cannot be considered successful unless they are actually
exercised to ensure that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall
exist.''1s7 If workers choose not to exercise their rights, then the rights
guarantees have failed, and the government must find some other way to fulfill
the constitutional command.' By itself, the definitional approach invites this
kind of failure. It waits until a worker has been deprived of a right that, by its
absence, defines the condition of involuntary servitude. It is unlikely that
workers who have been crushed into involuntary servitude will suddenly
discover and exert the "power below" to erase it. Workers who are immediately
threatened with servitude are likely to be relatively vulnerable, lacking the
economic, social, cultural, political, and legal resources to resist. Moreover,
subjugation typically involves repeated experiences of defeat, leading to
demoralization and self-abnegation. 8 , If constitutional enforcement focuses
between two systems; a controversy between right and wrong"); id. at 144o (statement of
Sen. Harlan) (advocating the Thirteenth Amendment on the ground that even slaveholders
would benefit from "a change of their system of labor from compulsory to voluntary"); and
id. at 1369 (statement of Sen. Clark) (asserting that the Amendment will "plant new
institutions of freedom").
186. Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat.
27. On the scope of the Civil Rights Act and its grounding in the Thirteenth Amendment,
see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § i. The Amendment bans those conditions not solely out of
concern for the individual victim, but also-as the Pollock Court, echoing the Framers,
observed-for all other workers "with whom his labor comes in competition." Pollock, 322
U.S. at 18; see also VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 445-48 (documenting the Framers' concern
with the impact of slavery and involuntary servitude on free laborers).
188. This was the situation in New Mexico during the lead-up to the Peonage Act of 1867. As
related in Congress, New Mexican peons already had an enforceable legal right to depart
their employers, but many lacked the desire to do so. See supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
189. Studies of power suggest that the experience of subjugation tends to spawn feelings of
powerlessness and acceptance, which are fostered and reinforced by socialization. See
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exclusively on these workers, then its efficacy will depend on the willingness of
government to commit the financial and other resources necessary to detect
and root out practices of unfree labor.'9 By contrast, Pollock relies on free
workers to exercise and enforce rights before falling into a servile state. Workers
who remain free from harsh domination and unwholesome conditions stand as
both guardians and exemplars of the Amendment's success; by exercising their
"power below," they give employers the "incentive above" to provide
nonservile jobs.
B. Workability of the Pollock Principle
The Pollock standard calls for judgments that cannot be reduced to bright-
line criteria capable of mechanical application. The determination whether a
given claimed right is necessary to provide workers with the "power below"
and employers the "incentive above" to avoid servitude necessarily involves
judgments about how the world works, as well as choices concerning the
significance and weight of precedent, original meaning, tradition, consensus,
and structural considerations bearing on the claimed right. Such open-textured
judgments are, however, endemic to the enterprise of applying broadly worded
rights guarantees. The role proposed here for Pollock in the jurisprudence of
involuntary servitude roughly parallels that of the doctrines of suspect
classifications, fundamental interests, high- and low-value speech, and content
discrimination in the jurisprudence of equal protection and freedom of speech.
Each of these doctrines draws on the history and purposes. of a constitutional
provision to construct principles intermediate in specificity between the highly
abstract constitutional text, on the one hand, and tests that can be applied to
the particular facts of specific cases (like strict, intermediate, and rational basis
scrutiny) on the other. None can be implemented without contestable
judgments both about the way the world works (for example, whether a
particular form of speech is important to the channels of political change, or
whether a given classification tends to be based on stereotypes) and about the
significance and weight of the various constitutional sources bearing on the
MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 181-82 (1964); JOHN GAVENTA, POWER
AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY 12-13 (1980);
STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 119-20, 137-39 (2d ed. 2005).
19o. See generally BALES, supra note 116, at 26-29, 237-38 (describing the difficulty of revealing and
eliminating forms of slavery that are disguised by contract and distanced by layers of
functionaries and subcontractors from the ultimate masters, most of whom are
"'respectable' businesspeople").
119:1474 2010
CONTRACT, RACE, AND FREEDOM OF LABOR
claimed right (for example, whether indecent speech should be protected
despite the lack of historical or early precedential support).
Pollock's concept of servitude operates in two domains: subjugation
("control," "harsh overlordship") and exploitation (the disposal of one person's
labor for "another's benefit," "unwholesome conditions of work"). But what,
exactly, is a "harsh overlordship," and what are "unwholesome conditions of
work"? Throughout the heated controversy over the inalienable right to quit,
both Congress and the Court sidestepped these questions. Instead of defining
and prohibiting the substance of servitude, they sought to provide workers
with the procedural rights necessary to avoid it. By guaranteeing the
procedural "right to change employers" as the means to prevent substantively
"oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment," the Court avoided
the need to specify the level of oppression that would trigger the
Amendment. 91
Even regarding procedural rights, however, issues may arise that call for
specifying the meaning of "harsh overlordship" and "unwholesome
conditions," if not by stated definition then by accumulated holdings. The key
judicial opinions and statutes protecting the right to quit were drafted with
relatively poor and powerless workers in mind, for example New Mexican
peons and southern agricultural laborers. But what about relatively privileged
workers? Does a Thirteenth Amendment right, once recognized, extend even to
workers who hold desirable jobs and earn relatively high pay? Consider, for
example, entertainers and professional athletes. Courts have held that although
no person may be enjoined to perform a contract for personal services, a person
who performs "unique" services may be barred from performing those services
for others. The fount of this doctrine was the famous English case of Lumley v.
Wagner, in which an opera singer under contract to Her Majesty's Theatre was
enjoined from singing for anyone else during the contract term.'92
A negative injunction of this type would be unconstitutional if directed at
an unskilled laborer. The Amendment guarantees "the right to change
employers," and that right is violated by a general prohibition on hiring a
person who is under contract to another. "If no one else could have employed
Carver during the term of his contract with plaintiff," reasoned one court, "the
result would have been to coerce him to perform the labor required by the
contract; for he had to work or starve."' 93 Lumley's American progeny ignored
191. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
192. Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 42IEng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch.).
193. Shaw v. Fisher, lOz S.E. 325, 327 (S.C. 1920) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 231-
232).
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this principle in particular and the problem of labor freedom generally,
focusing instead on the employer's need for injunctive relief to secure the
"unique" services of the worker.'94 How would the Lumley rule fare under
Pollock?
To begin with, the standard would shift the inquiry away from the
employer's need for unique services to the worker's need for the right to choose
the employer for whom she would practice her trade. Suppose, for example,
that a young actor contracted to perform with a particular theater company for
a two-year period. Suppose also that a two-year negative injunction would
likely ruin her acting career, but that she would have litde difficulty finding
employment as a cocktail server at any number of bars. Would the negative
injunction violate Pollock? The company might contend that the prospect of
serving cocktails is, unlike the prospect of starvation in Carver's case,
insufficiently coercive. If cocktail servers are not generally considered to be in a
condition of servitude, then the actor can escape servitude. The company might
also contend that the harsh overlordship and unwholesome conditions
associated with servitude necessarily involve "extreme" abuses like physical
violence,' 95 and that theater companies do not typically commit such abuses.
The actor might reply that the rights to change employers and to pursue a
chosen calling are both essential elements of a free labor system. She might
point to the centrality of a person's trade or profession to her happiness and
standing in the community, and argue that if theater companies hold the
power to banish actors from their trade, actors will lack the "power below" to
give theater companies the "incentive above" to avoid a harsh overlordship or
unwholesome conditions of work.' 6 She might note the possibility of serious
194. VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 841-42.
195. See Oman, supra note 24, at 2072 (proposing that the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment be
limited to "extremely oppressive relationships").
196. Cf. Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6, 7 (Dist. Ct. 1865) (declining to issue negative injunction
enforcing female performer's promise to sing, and querying: "Is it not obvious that a
contract for personal services thus enforced would be but a mitigated form of slavery, in
which the party would have lost the right to dispose of himself as a free agent, and be, for a
greater or less length of time, subject to the control of another?"). The court's opinion did
not mention the Thirteenth Amendment, but it echoed the free labor vision propounded by
its Framers. VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 795-99; see also Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d
402, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J.). Gardella involved the reserve clause inserted into
professional baseball players' contracts, according to which the employing team retained the
exclusive right to employ a player for a period of one year after his contract expired. New
York Giants outfielder Danny Gardella violated the reserve clause by playing briefly in the
Mexican League, for which he was barred from baseball for a period of years. His antitrust
suit was dismissed by the District Court and reinstated by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Circuit Judge Jerome Frank, an influential legal realist scholar, explained his vote
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employer abuses (for example unsafe conditions and high rates of exploitation)
even in relatively privileged jobs.197 In line with the doctrinal role of race and
sex proposed here, she might point out that the Lumley rule originally gained
its hold on American law in a series of cases involving efforts by male theater
managers to control the lives of female performers."98 However contentious
these issues might be, they appear susceptible to resolution using ordinary
methods of constitutional reasoning.
Similarly, issues will arise concerning particular threats to labor rights.
Consider the inalienable right to quit. We know that the right is protected
against legal and physical compulsion, but what about economic constraints?
Under the old rule of entireties, for example, a worker was required to serve for
the entire contract period - typically six months or a year - before receiving any
wages. If she quit before the end, she forfeited her wages up to that point.
Would this rule violate Pollock? The standard directs attention away from the
formal distinction between legal and economic compulsion, and toward the
question of whether the rule effectively deprives workers of the "power below"
to give employers the "incentive above" to prevent servitude. The affected
employee might contend that the rule could be "nearly as" effective as penal
sanctions in light of the dire consequences of large monetary losses on
marginal wage laborers, for example malnutrition, loss of shelter, and
consequent harm to physical and mental health.199 She might point out that
the Freedmen's Bureau set aside such laws, that state courts have held that
economic pressure can constitute coercion under the Thirteenth Amendment,
and that most states had abandoned the rule by the end of the nineteenth
for reinstatement partly by citing the Thirteenth Amendment and opining that the reserve
system "results in something resembling peonage of the baseball player." He added that "if
the players be regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well paid; only the
totalitarian-minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual slavery." Id. at 409, 410. Frank
went on to warn, unfortunately without explanation, that he was "not to be understood as
implying that [the player contracts] violate the Thirteenth Amendment or the statutes
enacted pursuant thereto." Id. at 410. This comment might have indicated either an
inclination to reject any possible Thirteenth Amendment claim, or simply an unwillingness
to confront the issue where it was not essential to resolving Gardella's case. The reserve
system was eventually abandoned after a lengthy struggle in which Curt Flood, an
African-American center fielder who deeply resented being treated as exchangeable
property, played a central role. BRAD SNYDER, AWELL PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD'S FIGHT FOR
FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (2006).
197. It is estimated, for example, that under the reserve system the rate of exploitation of baseball
players was more than three times the rate under free agency. STANLEY L. ENGERMAN,
SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION & FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 19 n.35 (2007).
198. VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 819-21.
199. STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 291, 310.
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century.20° Employers might reply that the rule was abandoned primarily for
reasons other than concerns about worker freedom. 21' They might suggest that
a monetary penalty does not exert the kind of extreme coercion that the
Amendment was intended to prohibit. Again, the standard does not
mechanically dictate a result, but the issue appears amenable to resolution by
ordinary methods.
Both of the preceding examples involve the claim that the Thirteenth
Amendment bans only "extreme" forms of labor oppression. Without
attempting a complete discussion of this possibility, a preliminary question
should be raised: against what baseline is the "extreme" character of
oppression to be determined? If "extreme" means unusual or exceptional in
terms of social practice, then a method of labor extraction -no matter how
egregious its impact on workers - might become constitutional by virtue of
widespread use, a result that would conflict with the Pollock standard. Around
the turn to the twentieth century, for example, workers in core industries faced
a high risk of mutilation or death from work-related accidents. 20 2 From our
perspective today, such carnage might appear to be extremely unwholesome,
but at the time it was widely perceived to be routine. A similar problem would
arise if "extreme" means unusual or exceptional in terms of cultural attitudes.
What is perceived as "extreme" about a given form of labor oppression may
have little to do with the actual harshness or unwholesomeness of the practice.
In the decades following enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, for
example, the exotic and archaic-appearing "padrone" loomed large in public
opinion as the villain responsible for oppressing vulnerable immigrant
workers.20 3 In fact, however, major corporations -including many that were
considered among the most progressive of their day-not only relied upon
labor supplied by padrones, but also duplicated their methods of labor control.
It was much easier for reformers to direct their energies against the padrones,
who could be depicted as extreme, than against the mainstream American
corporations that were fostering and imitating padronism.2 4 Under the Pollock
2oo. See, e.g., Thompson v. Box, 112 So. S97, 599 (Miss. 1927); Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 327
(S.C. 1920); STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 312; VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 492-93.
201. SCHMIDT, supra note 34, at 195-96; STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 312.
202. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004).
203. PECK, supra note 104, at 23.
204. See id. at 49-51, 67-68, 230. Historians have noted a similar dynamic with regard to the
Mann "White Slavery" Act, which was targeted at "foreigners," especially Jews. Jennifer M.
Chac6n, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts To Stop Human
Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3016 (2006).
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standard, however, what matters is the harshness of subjugation and the
unwholesomeness of conditions, not whether the employers involved are
perceived as exceptional. Adding a requirement of "extreme" oppression might
invite timidity and discourage principled enforcement.
C. Prudential Concerns
In Bailey and Pollock, the Court held that the state statutes at issue
transgressed not only the Peonage Act, but also the Thirteenth Amendment
itself. Instead of relying on the discretion of Congress, the Court affirmatively
adjudged that the Amendment had been violated.2"' Usually, however, the
Court defers to Congress in defining violations of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Congress is empowered "rationally to determine what are the badges and the
incidents of slavery" and to eliminate them.2°6 The question of whether
methods of employer control other than physical or legal coercion amount to
involuntary servitude is, according to the Court, "a value judgment... best left
for Congress." 0 7 Thus, Congress may be empowered to enact legislation
protecting various rights under its Section 2 enforcement power even though
the Court would not, on its own, hold those rights to be protected under
Section 1.
It is -also true, however, that the Court routinely enforces many
constitutional provisions that are more difficult to apply than the Involuntary
Servitude Clause. The phrases "freedom of speech" and "equal protection of
the laws," for example, sweep far more broadly than "involuntary servitude."
Speech is integral to a vast range of human activities, and statutes invariably
treat some people differently (unequally) from others. Accordingly, these
phrases have given rise to intricate doctrinal structures replete with value
hierarchies (as noted above, for example: high-, intermediate-, and low-value
speech; fundamental and nonfundamental interests; and suspect,
quasi-suspect, and nonsuspect classifications) as well as imprecise phrases like
"substantially related" and "substantial" or "compelling" governmental
interests. Although courts are justified in allowing Congress leeway to protect
Thirteenth Amendment rights, mere difficulty of application cannot justify a
complete judicial retreat from the field."' Interestingly, the Supreme Court of
205. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 24 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244-45 (1911).
2o6. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,440 (1968).
207. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988).
2os. See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges
and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1311, 1339-55 (2007). Carter concludes, based
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Canada recently reached a similar conclusion in the process of repudiating its
precedents and recognizing the right of workers to bargain collectively under
the Canadian Charter of Rights. "It may well be appropriate for judges to defer
to legislatures on policy matters expressed in particular laws," observed the
Court.20 9 "But to declare a judicial 'no go' zone for an entire right on the
ground that it may involve the courts in policy matters is to push deference too
far."210 Categorical deference on that scale, combined with a willingness to
apply other difficult provisions, hints unsubtly at a class bias against working
people.
It might be argued that judicial enforcement of the Pollock principle would
amount to a revival of Lochner-Era economic due process. But the Court's
rationale for repudiating economic due process, explained in the famous
Carolene Products footnote four, does not appear to cover the Involuntary
Servitude Clause. According to the footnote, legislatures are generally entitled
to judicial deference, but less deference may be due in cases involving "a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments."21' Under this schema, the Involuntary Servitude Clause
resembles more closely the first ten amendments than "the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 1' Unlike the clauses guaranteeing "equal
protection" or "liberty," it refers to a particular relationship and provides
limiting criteria. The constitutional text prohibits "involuntary servitude," and
there is no apparent reason - at least in the abstract - why the courts cannot
apply the already-tested approach developed in the right-to-quit cases to
resolve other labor rights claims.
Finally, it might be thought that because the Thirteenth Amendment is not
limited to governmental action, an expansive interpretation would authorize
intrusive judicial regulation of private activity.2" However, the courts have
on the legislative debates, that the Amendment was understood to create a "concurrent
power of Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branch to enforce the freedmen's
rights," and not to limit the judiciary's power to instances of literal slavery. Id. at 1345.
209. Health Servs. & Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass'n v. British Columbia, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 391, 414, 2007 SCC 27 (Can.).
210. Id.
211. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
212. Id.
213. Cf George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the Politics of
Civil Rights (manuscript at lo), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=147316o (suggesting that the contrast between the pattern of
judicial decisions under the self-enforcing provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment ("few
and restrictive") and the Fourteenth Amendment ("many and expansive") reflects the
absence of a state-action limitation in the former).
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always regulated private employment relations. Judges, not legislatures,
developed the common law of master and servant, imported the crime of labor
conspiracy from England, and developed the labor injunction. Judges continue
to shape the law of individual employment rights today. It is one thing to argue
that judges should defer to legislatures in the regulation of private activity, a
contention addressed immediately above. But the notion that judicial
regulation of private employment relations is objectionable per se is
unpersuasive in light of the fact that private employment relations have been
subject to judicial and legislative regulation from the outset.1 4 A more
expansive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment would alter the
substance, not the scope, of judicial intervention in private employment
relations.
V. COERCION AND SERVITUDE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
The theory of Bailey and Pollock hinges, as we have seen, on the "servitude"
element of involuntary servitude. Instead of rendering servitude "voluntary,"
the right to quit gives workers the "power below" and employers the "incentive
above" to raise the employment condition above servitude. In popular
discourse, however, the focus is more likely to be on the "voluntary" element.
Surely, an individual who enjoys the right to quit could not possibly be in a
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude. If her employment descends to
servitude, then it must - by virtue of the right to quit - be voluntary servitude.
Part V probes this intuitively powerful claim and concludes that its viability
hinges on the assumption that the approach of Bailey and Pollock is working:
that the right to quit is, in fact, providing workers with the "power below" and
employers with the "incentive above" to provide employment opportunities
that rise above servitude.
The right to quit can render servitude voluntary only if, after the worker
quits, some constitutionally acceptable alternative is available. As Bailey and
Pollock make clear, for example, going to jail or facing physical punishment for
quitting is unacceptable. In addition, psychological and other nonphysical
forms of punishment (for example, warnings about possible deportation and
threats not to send money home to an immigrant worker's family) have been
outlawed by federal legislation enacted to enforce the Thirteenth
214. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(1993).
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Amendment."' But what about the worker in servitude who faces no
consequences for quitting other than the resulting loss of wages, benefits,
status, and membership in a workplace community? For such a worker, there
are three basic alternatives to remaining in servitude: (1) escaping the
employment relation by going into business for oneself (self-employment),
(2) escaping the employment relation by forgoing the gainful use of labor
power, or (3) finding a new job. Unless at least one of these alternatives is both
constitutionally sufficient and available as a practical matter, then the worker is
in a condition of involuntary servitude."16 Which, if any, of the alternatives are
constitutionally acceptable? Do they, individually or in combination, obviate
the need for any labor rights other than the right to quit?
This Part argues that (1) self-employment does provide a constitutionally
sufficient alternative to servitude, but it is not - in practice - available to many
workers; (2) forgoing the gainful use of labor power is not a constitutionally
sufficient alternative to servitude; and (3) obtaining another job can be a
constitutionally sufficient alternative to servitude, but only if the new job does
not entail a relation of servitude. The third point brings the argument back to
Bailey and Pollock, with their focus on empowering workers to elevate the
employment condition above servitude.
A. Remain in Servitude or Escape into Self-Employment (The Right To Quit)
It seems fairly obvious that genuine self-employment provides a
constitutionally sufficient alternative to servitude. 17 A self-employed individual
215. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 1486 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1589 (2000)); United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 711 (7 th Cir. 2008)
(upholding conviction for subjecting a domestic worker to forced labor based mainly on
defendants' threats not to send money back to her home in the Philippines, and warnings as
to "her precarious position under the immigration laws"); United States v. Bradley, 390
F.3d 145, 150-51 (ist Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005).
216. Cf New York v. United States, 5o5 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (explaining that a choice between
two unconstitutional alternatives is "no choice at all"). The set of three alternatives was
formulated to encompass the full range of possibilities without skipping over any point that
requires justification. Starvation is not listed as a possible alternative, but it is considered
along with the first and second listed alternatives. The notion that one individual cannot be
subjected to involuntary servitude except by the wrongful action of another is addressed in
the discussion of the third alternative.
217. Self-employment is nongenuine when a person is nominally self-employed, but in fact has
little or no control over her labor. Examples include nominally "independent" cleaning
contractors who labor under the direction of their "customers." See Marc Linder, Dependent
and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in
Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187 (1999).
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might face the choice of working or starving, but her work is outside any
relation of servitude. As long as an economy provides plenty of opportunity for
self-employment, the right to quit can plausibly be seen as a way to escape
servitude. Abraham Lincoln, for example, claimed that the relation between
capital and labor "does not embrace more than one-eighth of the labor of the
country," and that the wage worker of today would become the independent
free laborer of tomorrow." ' Most opponents of slavery presumed that the
alternative to slave labor was not wage labor, but economic independence as a
self-employed farmer, artisan, or entrepreneur. It was expected that many
people would go through a period of wage labor, but for all but the indolent or
unwilling, this would be a temporary stop on the way to self-employment. 219
Suppose, however, that Lincoln's one-eighth proportion were reversed, and
the relation between capital and labor embraced more than seven-eighths of
the economy- as it does in the United States today." ° Then, the right to quit
would enable-at most-only one out of every eight workers to escape the
employment relation. What about the other seven? Interestingly, the
possibility of self-employment could- theoretically- render them free as well.
Under the assumption that no more than one out of eight workers wants self-
employment, each individual would be free to choose and nobody would be
forced to remain in servitude.22 '
The assumption, however, appears to be counterfactual. The total number
of self-employed Americans is about fifteen million, a figure that has been
declining or stable since 1948." At any given time, roughly five to seven
million Americans are engaged in starting up a business." 3 The "main factor
leading to survival" is having employees, but even companies with employees
218. 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 459 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
219. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 96, at 33; RODGERS, supra note 130, at 33-35; VanderVelde, supra
note 2, at 471-74.
22o. As of 2003, the self-employed accounted for 1.i percent of all employment. Steven Hipple,
Self-Employment in the United States: An Update, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 2004, at 14-15.
This figure was obtained by adding unincorporated self-employment, id. at 14 tbl.i, to
incorporated self-employment, id. at 15 tbl.2.
221. See G.A. Cohen, The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 9-11, 32
(1983).
222. Hipple, supra note 220, at 14 & tbl.1, 15 & tbl.2.
223. William J. Dennis, Jr., More Than You Think: An Inclusive Estimate of Business Entries, 12 J.
Bus. VENTURING 175, 188-89 (1997) (estimating, based on survey of 36,ooo households,
that about 4.9 million people were engaged in starting up a business in 1995); Paul
Reynolds, The Truth About Start-Ups, 17 INC. 23, 24 (1995) (estimating that seven million
Americans are engaged in starting up a business at any given time).
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face a greater than fifty-fifty chance of termination within four years. There
are no reliable survival statistics for start-ups without employees, which make
up more than eighty-five percent of the total,"5 but they are considered "very
volatile. '' 226 Beyond lack of employees, two of the most reliable predictors of
failure are shortage of capital and lack of a college degree.2 7 The workers who
are of most concern under the Thirteenth Amendment, those in servitude or in
danger of servitude, are unlikely to have college degrees, adequate capital, or
the capacity to hire employees. For such workers, the most likely results of an
attempt at self-employment would be loss of the current job, exhaustion of
savings, failure of the business within a few years, and return to the job
market. Thus, the worker's actual choice is not between servitude and self-
employment but between servitude and a long-odds gamble on escaping into
self-employment. Under these circumstances, the worker who remains in
servitude is voluntarily declining self-employment in much the same way that a
person who refrains from buying a lottery ticket is voluntarily declining to
strike it rich. If self-employment were the only alternative to servitude, then,
many workers would be submitting to servitude, and they would be doing it
involuntarily. (The counterargument that their servitude is voluntary because
nobody is wrongfully blocking their escape is considered below.228 )
224. Brian Headd, Redefining Business Success: Distinguishing Between Closure and Failure, 21
SMALL Bus. ECON. 51, 56 (2003); see Amy E. Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business
Employment Dynamics Data, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2005, at 50, 51. Not all terminated
businesses close because of failure. In one survey, 29.1% of the owners of closed businesses
reported that the "status" of their business at the time of closure was "successful" as
opposed to "unsuccessful" (the only other choice). Headd, supra, at 56.
225. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESSES:
2002, at 1 (20o6), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/eco2/sbo2oocscb.pdf (reporting
that roughly 12% of 12,595,657 nonemployer businesses reported being created within the
past year, as compared to 4.2% of 4,o91,884 employer businesses, leading to the conclusion
that 90% of start-ups were nonemployer businesses).
226. Headd, supra note 224, at 6o n.9.
227. Id. at 55. Even if a worker succeeds in remaining self-employed, she has a one-sixth chance
of earning less than the minimum wage. John F. Pinfold, The Expectations of New Business
Founders: The New Zealand Case, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., July 2001, at 279, 279 (citing a
finding of the U.S. Small Business Administration).
228. See infra text accompanying notes 251-257.
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B. Remain in Servitude or Forgo Gainful Labor (The Right To Change
Employers)
Suppose that a worker is physically and legally free to quit her job and
cease working altogether. Suppose also, for the moment, that she will starve if
she quits. Is this a constitutionally sufficient alternative to servitude? Generally,
an employee who faces the alternatives "work or starve" is not considered to be
in a condition of forced labor or involuntary servitude.229 Part of the reason for
this is the assumption that she can seek a job from any number of other
employers (a possibility discussed below). 3 But what if her only alternative
were to forgo gainful labor altogether?
Recall that the Supreme Court of South Carolina confronted this issue in
Shaw v. Fisher. A sharecropper named Carver breached his one-year
employment contract with Shaw and took a job with Fisher. Shaw obtained an
award of damages against Fisher for the tort of knowingly hiring a worker who
had quit his previous employer in violation of a labor contract. The high court
reversed. "If no one else could have employed Carver during the term of his
contract with plaintiff," reasoned the court, "the result would have been to
coerce him to perform the labor required by the contract; for he had to work or
starve." Because this "compulsion would have been scarcely less effectual than
if it had been induced by the fear of punishment under a criminal statute for
breach of his contract," it violated the Thirteenth Amendment. 3' Although the
Court posed the alternatives as work or starve, that language did not fully
capture the gravamen of the violation. Stated more precisely, Carver's
alternatives were to workfor his current employer or to quit and starve.
The holding of Shaw can be framed in either of two ways. In the words of
the Court, the tort action violated Carver's right to quit because, by removing
229. The contrary position would require an affirmative guarantee of sustenance regardless of
labor output, never a widely held view in the United States except for enslaved individuals
and those unable to work. "The true incentives to labor in the free States," observed one
reconstruction official, "are hunger and cold." SCHMIDT, supra note 34, at 138.
230. Cf. Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 67 (Cal. 1998) (finding no involuntary servitude
where a parent was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a court order commanding
him to obtain employment in order to pay child support, reasoning that he remained "free
to elect the type of employment and the employer").
231. Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 327 (1920); see also Thompson v. Box, 112 So. 597, 599-600
(Miss. 1927) (observing that a statute prohibiting a person from knowingly employing a
laborer who had breached his contract would violate the Thirteenth Amendment because
the laborer would, as a practical matter, be forced to "stay or starve," and construing the
statute not to require such a result so as to avoid the constitutional violation); STEINFELD,
supra note 4, at 287-88.
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his chances of obtaining another job, it "coerce[d]" him not to quit his current
one. His practical alternatives -work for his current employer or starve-
amounted to unconstitutional coercion. Shaw could also be read, however, to
hold that a worker enjoys not only the right to quit, but also what the Supreme
Court would later describe as "the right to change employers."232 Without this
right, the right to quit would be rendered pointless. Because Carver's only
alternative was to quit and starve, his employer could offer any set of terms and
conditions superior to starvation, including servitude. In the language of
Pollock, the right to quit by itself provided Carver with no "power below" or
"incentive above" to prevent a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions
of work.
The Thirty-Ninth Congress, which included most of the senators and
representatives who had framed and debated the Thirteenth Amendment,23
confronted similar problems. Southern planters were attempting to regain
control over their former slaves by preventing them from obtaining new
employment after quitting their jobs. For example, planters agreed among
themselves not to hire any freed person without the permission of his or her
previous employer. 34 Under this system, the worker could quit his job, but
then nobody would employ him. Prominent Republicans in Congress charged
that this, and other measures to prevent quitting workers from finding new
jobs, amounted to a reestablishment of slavery. 3 The formal right to quit and
starve was not enough; the worker must also enjoy the right to find another
job. Not all agreed, but the dissenters were in the minority, and their influence
declined rapidly over time.3
6
Today, some workers who quit will eventually qualify for public assistance.
Although this option reduces the immediate pressure against quitting, it does
not in itself provide a constitutionally sufficient alternative to servitude. If the
relief is temporary, it only postpones starvation. And if it is permanent, it
makes a mockery of the Amendment's central purpose, which was to establish
a system of free labor. 37 A person who faces a choice between remaining in
z3. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (944). The right to change employers was also
mentioned in the Thirty-Ninth Congress. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 116o (1866)
(statement of Sen. Windom) ("Do you call that man free who cannot choose his own
employer ... ?"); id. at ii1 (1865) (statement of Sen. Wilson) (discussing a freedman's right
to "work when and for whom he pleases").
233. See supra note 35.
234. SCHMIDT, supra note 34, at 99.
235. See VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 491 & nn.237-40 (quoting and paraphrasing the senators).
236. See id. at 453-54, 475-76, 482-83.
237. See supra notes 18o, 185 and accompanying text.
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servitude or forgoing gainful labor is excluded altogether from whatever free
labor system might exist. Slavery was considered evil not because it entailed
labor (all able-bodied adults were expected to work for a living), but because
the labor of slaves was coerced, degraded, and uncompensated. In the
discourse of the time, labor was celebrated as an essential expression of human
nature, a reflection of civic virtue, and a source of prosperity.238 Unlike slavery,
the free labor system would provide the opportunity for every citizen "to till
the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and enjoy the rewards of
his own labor."239 Instead of the independent laborer envisioned by the
Framers and Ratifiers, an individual excluded from productive labor would
become a noncontributing, dependent idler unfit for citizenship in a
democracy-in effect an involuntary vagrant. Modem social science has since
documented the human costs of this status, including grossly increased rates of
clinical depression, alcoholism, drug addiction, physical illness, abuse of family
members, and suicide." 0
C. Remain in Servitude or Find Another Job (The Right To Set One's Wages)
With abstention from labor eliminated as a sufficient option, only one
alternative remains for a worker in servitude: quit and find another job. Is this
a constitutionally sufficient alternative? If a worker can quit and obtain another
job in which she is treated - for example - like a "partner" (Richard Epstein's
characterization of the typical employment relation in the United States), 4
then she could escape servitude by exercising her right to change employers.
Or, if changing employers or threatening to change employers gave workers
the "power below" and employers the "incentive above" to raise employment
238. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 130, at 6-7, 10-14; VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 447-48,
461-62, 464. Central to the critique of slavery was its tendency to foster worship of leisure
and contempt for honest work among free laborers as well as slaves. FONER, supra note 96,
at 46-47, 58-59.
239. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., ist Sess. 2990 (1864) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll) (emphasis
removed).
24o. Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMp. L. 149, 162-63
(2005) (citing studies on the psychological, physical, and behavioral effects of
unemployment); see also Forbath, supra note 94, at 16 (observing that "all the empirical
literature suggests that the most salient border between minimum respect and degradation
in today's class structure falls along the line between" the employed (and their spouses) and
the unemployed).
241. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 962-77
(1984) (analogizing the employment contract to a partnership agreement). This view is
reflected in the growing tendency of employers to label their employees "associates."
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conditions above servitude, there would be no more servitude. But what if the
worker could only exchange one master for another, enduring servitude either
way? Her alternatives -"submit to servitude or starve" -would seem to be no
more acceptable than the alternatives "remain in servitude or starve." In this
situation, the right to change employers would be -by itself- insufficient to
prevent involuntary servitude.
It might be objected that the term "involuntary servitude" implies
"involuntary servitude for a particular master," and that one cannot-by
definition-be in a condition of involuntary servitude if one can quit one's
master. In contract law, for example, labor contracts are distinguished from
other contracts on the ground that they involve a personal relationship. Specific
performance is said to be inappropriate because one person should not be
forced into a personal relationship with another. If the employee can terminate
the relationship, then the distinction disappears, and labor contracts can be
treated like other contracts. " 2 Only rarely do courts express concern that in an
unfavorable labor market "the fear of economic distress is a compelling force
which, when combined with the superior position of the employer, destroys
the free agency of the employee." 43
The Thirteenth Amendment, however, is concerned with far more than a
forced personal relationship between two individuals. Imagine, for example, an
economy in which employers collectively and unilaterally set the terms and
conditions of employment for all workers. In this hypothetical economy,
workers enjoy the right to quit and change employers, but employers
invariably adhere to an unofficial norm of compliance with the collectively set
terms and conditions. Assuming that the workers' right to quit is genuine, and
employers do not undermine it by punishing its exercise, then it would provide
effective protection against a forced personal relationship with a particular
individual. It would not, however, enable workers to avoid a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work. Workers would quickly
learn the futility of quitting as a means of obtaining better wages and
conditions.
The Thirty-Ninth Congress confronted a similar situation when southern
planters entered into compacts regulating the wages that they would pay to
laborers, or accomplished the same result by obtaining the passage of state
maximum wage legislation. These measures did not restrict the individual
right to quit or impose any kind of physical or legal coercion on employees to
242. See, e.g., H.W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 1O9 N.W. 483,490 (Iowa 19o6).
243. Caivano v. Brill Contracting Corp., 11 N.Y.S.2d 498, 502 (Mun. Ct. 1939) (holding that an
employment contract obligating a plumber to make kick-back payments to the employer
had been entered into under economic duress and was therefore void).
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work. Nevertheless, leading Republicans condemned the fixing of wages,
whether by private agreement among the planters or by legislation, and
maintained that the free laborer necessarily enjoyed not only the right to quit,
but also the right to set his own wages. ' " As Senator Windom demanded: "Do
you call that man free who cannot choose his own employer, or name the
wages for which he will work?"4 s On this view, the point of the individual
right to quit is not merely to enable the worker to escape a particular master or
to change employers, but also to empower her to influence her wages and other
conditions of employment -the philosophy Congress expressed in the Peonage
Act of 1867 and the Supreme Court endorsed in Bailey and Pollock.'46 In the
view of most Republicans, one defining distinction between a free labor system
and a slave system was the capacity of the former to ensure that the laborer
could "enjoy the rewards of his own labor.'
' 47
It should be noted that employer wage-fixing can be framed as a
Thirteenth Amendment violation in either of two ways. First, as Senator
Windom suggested, workers might enjoy a Thirteenth Amendment right to set
their own wages, in which case employer wage-fixing would violate that right.
Alternatively, employer wage-fixing might violate the right to quit itself. By
eliminating any possibility of obtaining higher wages, it would render the right
pointless - like a law that permitted anybody to speak all they wanted, but only
if nobody heard.
If an employer- or government-enforced maximum wage violates
Thirteenth Amendment rights, then does it follow that a minimum wage also
violates the Amendment? This question raises once again the clash between the
freedom of contract and the freedom of labor. If the worker's right to set her
244. VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 493-94. On the combinations of planters to fix the wages of
freed people, see 1 THE BLACK WORKER, supra note 1, at 341-42, 345-46.
245. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 1st Sess. 116o (1866) (statement of Sen. Windom); see also id. at
589 (statement of Rep. Donnelly) (charging that under the planters' measures, the freedman
"shall work at a rate of wages to be fixed by a county judge or a Legislature made up of
white masters, or by combinations of white masters, and not in any case by himself").
246. See supra Sections I.B.-C.
247. CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll); see also id. at
1313 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (asserting "the right of every man to eat the bread his
own hands had earned"); CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 588 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Donelly) ("[S]lavery is not confined to any precise condition.... A man may be a slave...
when deprived of a portion of the wages of his labor as fully as if deprived of all. .. ").
Some slaves were permitted to hire themselves out to labor for others, retaining a portion of
the proceeds for themselves and transmitting the remainder to their owners. STERLING D.
SPERO & ABRAM L. HARRs, THE BLACK WORKER: THE NEGRO AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 6
(1968).
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own wages sounds in contract, then it would seem that she could set them as
low as she pleases. Under Bailey and Pollock, however, the Amendment
guarantees rights necessary to protect the freedom of labor-to avoid a harsh
overlordship and unwholesome conditions of work. Permitting workers to
undercut each other could defeat that purpose. The payment of a living wage
has long been cited as one of the basic distinctions between freedom and
slavery.' 4s If, as found by Congress in the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
spontaneous operation of the market fails to prevent "the existence.., of labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers," then
minimum wage regulation might be not only permissible, but required under
the Amendment. 49
D. Beyond Market Rights
Thus far, the discussion has proceeded on the assumption that-in the
absence of employer cartels or government regulation-the labor market will
operate so that the market rights to quit, to change employers, and to set wages
will suffice to provide workers with the "power below" and employers the
"incentive above" to prevent servitude. But suppose that the labor market did
not function in this way (a supposition that, as related below, finds
considerable support in judicial and legislative sources, as well as the economic
literature)."' Suppose that, without any provable cartel or norm enforcement,
employers were able to impose authority so overweening and conditions so
harsh as to amount to servitude. Under such circumstances, would the
248. See STANLEY, supra note 114, at 153-57; VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 473-74, 499-500.
During the 194os, the U.S. Department of Labor explored the possibility that the Thirteenth
Amendment mandated minimum standards of compensation and working conditions.
GOLUBOFF, supra note 4, at 143.
249. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. S 202(a) (2006); see also infra text
accompanying notes 324-332 (summarizing the economic literature on imbalances of
bargaining power in the employment relation). The FLSA was enacted under authority of
the Commerce Clause, not the Thirteenth Amendment. Although early versions of the
legislation focused on implementing the living wage, a concept compatible with Bailey and
Pollock, the final version sought primarily to "redress substandard wages as a means to
remedy the underconsumption which President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his allies
believed sparked and prolonged the Depression." Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L.J. 19, 21 (2ooo); see also id. at 139-41
(recounting defeat of living-wage concept).
250. See inf'a Section VI.D.
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servitude of workers who accepted jobs to avoid starvation be voluntary or
involuntary?
At first glance, this question appears virtually identical to one that has been
extensively debated by philosophers. "Whether a person's actions are voluntary
depends on what it is that limits his alternatives," argues Robert Nozick.2"'
Before a person's actions can be considered involuntary (or coerced), he
contends, two elements must be present. First, the limiting force must be
human, not natural. When a castaway struggles to survive on a desert island,
for example, she does so voluntarily despite being faced with the choice of
working or starving. Only people-not nature-can put coercive limits on a
person's available opportunities. Second, the people who impose the limits
must not be acting within their rights." 2 Nozick hypothesizes a laborer, Z, who
faces the choice of working or starving because the actions of persons A
through Y "do not add up to providing Z with some other option." If Z works
to avoid starvation, does she do so voluntarily? Nozick answers yes, provided
that "the other individuals A through Y each acted voluntarily and within their
rights."" 3 In other words, as long as A through Y are not conduits for outside
coercion, and as long as they are within their rights (for example, to exclude Z
from their property), their insistence that she work for her food does not
amount to coercion and does not render her work involuntary.
Accepting Nozick's analysis as a starting point, it does not follow that a
worker who enters servitude to avoid starvation does so voluntarily within the
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment does not
prohibit involuntary work or labor; it prohibits involuntary servitude.
Moreover, unlike the philosophical concept of involuntary labor, the
constitutional phrase "involuntary servitude" is embedded in an authoritative
legal text with a context and a history that must be considered in determining
the scope of employer rights. Neither the terminological difference nor the
context affects Nozick's first requirement for coercion- that the limiting force
be human. Unlike work in general, servitude is a human relationship. Every
worker in servitude has one or more human masters. 54 But on the second
251. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 262 (1974).
2S2. Id.
253. Id. at 263-64.
254. Servitude is defined in relational terms. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17
(19o6) (defining servitude as "'the state of voluntary or compulsory subjection to a master'"
(quoting WEBSTER'S DIcriONARY (1901))); NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1207 (1865) (defining servitude as "[t]he state of voluntary or
involuntary subjection to a master"); JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
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requirement -that employers A through Y not be acting within their rights -
the Thirteenth Amendment fundamentally alters Nozick's hypothetical in two
ways. First, the question whether A through Y enjoy a right to impose servitude
as a condition of employment differs importantly from the question whether
they have a general right to propose an unspecified labor contract requiring a
person to work. If we were to conclude that merely by proposing an unspecified
labor contract, A through Y were compelling individuals to work involuntarily,
then the capitalist wage bargain would be inherently involuntary, and it would
appear that only socialism could conceivably deliver actual labor freedom.
Nozick formulated his analysis to refute this contention. But- assuming that
"servitude" is not inherent in the capitalist employment relation-no such
conclusion follows from denying a right to propose servitude. Employers do not
coerce workers merely by offering them jobs as an alternative to starvation; they
do so by offering them servitude -a condition of employer domination and
worker subjugation. Alternatively, an employer might propose a partnership of
equals or membership in a cooperative enterprise, or the government might
guarantee rights that raise employment above servitude, for example the right
to organize a union and/or to participate in a works council or other form of
effective industrial democracy."' If wrongfulness is a required element of
coercion, then, it would appear to be satisfied in the Thirteenth Amendment
context when an employer offers harsh domination or unwholesome
conditions of employment.
More fundamentally, it is questionable whether the voluntariness of one
person's actions should be determined with reference to the wrongfulness of
another's. G.A. Cohen has argued, for example, that Nozick's analysis is a
"false account, because it has the absurd upshot that if a criminal's
imprisonment is morally justified, he is then not forced to be in prison.
'2,6
Whatever the merits of this argument in the context of philosophical debate, it
becomes compelling in the context of the Thirteenth Amendment. It is far
more in keeping with the philosophy of the Amendment to determine the
rights of employers by assessing their impact on worker freedom than to
determine the scope of worker freedom by assessing the rightfulness of
employer contract proposals. At each stage of the historic struggle over the
right to quit, one side focused on the rights of employers and workers to enter
into binding contracts, while the other stressed the effective ability of workers
LANGUAGE 1314 (s86o) (defining servitude as "[t]he state or condition of a servant, or more
commonly of a slave; slavery; bondage").
255. For an increasingly common analogy that imagines the capitalist employee as having the
dignity and freedom of a partner, see supra note 241.
256. Cohen, supra note 221, at 4.
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to protect themselves against domination and exploitation.5 7 On the latter,
prevailing view, it would seem that if a worker is confronted with two
alternatives -endure servitude under one master or endure servitude under
another-then that person has no choice, and her servitude is involuntary
regardless of whether her master has committed a wrongful act.
To sum up, self-employment is a constitutionally acceptable alternative to
servitude, but it is available only to a small fraction of American workers.
Unemployment is not an acceptable alternative, because a worker whose
options are limited to unemployment and servitude is excluded from the free
labor system. Finally, it appears that a worker who must choose between
remaining in servitude under one master and entering into a new relation of
servitude under another master is in a condition of involuntary servitude. It
does not matter whether this choice results from a legal constraint, from
unofficial collective action by employers, or simply from the uncoordinated
action of individual employers who prefer that their employees enter into
servitude and who have the bargaining power to obtain that result. In a nation
of employees, workers can escape servitude only if nonservile jobs are available.
And if the market rights to quit, to change employers, and to name wages do
not provide workers with the "power below" and employers the "incentive
above" to ensure a supply of nonservile jobs, then something more is required
to ensure compliance with the constitutional command that "[n]either slavery
nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States."
What might that something more be? Historically, two basic forms of
nonmarket labor rights have been considered. First, the government could
attempt to prevent harsh domination and unwholesome conditions through
direct regulation establishing a baseline of minimum labor standards. After
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act under the commerce power, for
example, the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department drew on the
Thirteenth Amendment in its efforts to extend similar protections to
agricultural and other workers who had been excluded from the Act's
coverage.2 Second, government could protect nonmarket procedural rights
(for example, the workers' freedom of association, including the rights to
organize and strike) in an effort to extend Pollock's approach of giving workers
the "power below" to give employers the "incentive above" to prevent harsh
domination and unwholesome conditions. These methods could be used singly
or in combination. As a vehicle for exploring the possibility of nonmarket labor
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, the second possibility offers several
257. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
258. GOLUBOFF, supra note 4, at 143.
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advantages. First, because it shares the procedural character of the right to quit
and other rights discussed earlier, it fits more readily into the case law. Second,
it would be easier for courts to adjudicate and enforce (as opposed to setting
minimum wages and other standards for "wholesome" conditions). Finally,
there is a long and distinguished history of struggle over the issue that can
serve as a starting point for the inquiry.
VI. THE WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Not servitude, but service.
- Slogan of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 1926259
Beginning around the turn of the twentieth century, American workers and
unions claimed the rights to organize and strike under the Thirteenth
Amendment. Quoting Bailey and Pollock, they argued that the rights to
organize and strike were necessary to provide workers with the "power below"
to prevent "that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of
or coerced for another's benefit, which is the essence of involuntary
servitude. ''26, Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) General Counsel Lee
Pressman explained that "the right of individual workers to quit their jobs has
meaning only when they may quit in concert, so that in their quitting or in
their threat to quit they have a real bargaining strength. "261 The American
Federation of Labor maintained that
every human being has under the Thirteenth Amendment... the right
to associate with other human beings for the protection and
advancement of their common interests as workers, and in such
259. ERIC ARNESEN, BROTHERHOODS OF COLOR: BLACK RAILROAD WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQuALITY 90 (2001); A. Saggitarius, Not Servitude but Setvice, 8 MESSENGER 324 (1926),
reprinted in THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA: NEGRO PERIODICALS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1840-196o: MESSENGER: VOLUME 8, 1926, at 324 (1969).
26o. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911);
FORBATH, supra note 4, at 135-41; James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 1o6 YALE
L.J. 941 (1997); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:
Labor and the Shaping ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002)
[hereinafter Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment].
261. Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare on S. 55 & S.j. Res. 22, 8oth Cong.
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association to negotiate through representatives of their own choosing
concerning the terms of employment and conditions of labor, and to
take concerted action for their own protection in labor disputes.262
If courts were to recognize Thirteenth Amendment rights of association,
the law would be changed in several ways. First, rights of association would be
extended to domestic workers, agricultural workers, and other categories of
workers that are presently excluded from statutory protections. Second, labor
laws and doctrines that pertain to associational rights would be subject to
critical judicial scrutiny. Among the most vulnerable would be the rule that
employers may permanently replace workers who strike for better wages and
conditions, the flat ban on secondary boycotts, the absence of effective
remedies for employer retaliation, and state bans on public worker collective
bargaining, all of which violate international standards.263 Third and finally,
Congress would be provided with a new source of authority for enforcing
workers' rights. Up to now, Congress has relied upon the power to regulate
interstate commerce, which was chosen over the labor movement's objections.
As a result, workers' rights have been treated not as essential elements of labor
freedom, but as mere means to the end of facilitating commerce. 6 4 This kind
of thinking has influenced the results in numerous cases, including those
announcing the permanent replacement rule, denying workers a right of self-
help, authorizing employers to exclude union organizers from their property,
and denying the NLRB the power to punish unfair labor practices so as to deter
future violations.26 s
262. AFL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, TExT OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION BILL APPROVED BY THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 1 (1931).
263. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 18, 31, 171-90, 212
(2000).
264. In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, for example, the
Supreme Court held that a group of black workers who picketed their employer to protest
race discrimination were outside the protection of section 7 because their picketing had not
been authorized by their white-led union. Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood
Marshall famously observed that section 7 rights "are protected not for their own sake but as
an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife 'by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.'" 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 151).
265. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. lo5, 112 (1956); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36
(1938); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); see James
Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right To Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L.
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A half century ago, Archibald Cox suggested that the appropriate standard
for assessing the claimed Thirteenth Amendment right to strike is to be found
in Pollock v. Will iams, an approach defended in Part III above.266 But the Court
has never applied Bailey or Pollock or any other standard in a case involving the
right to strike. This Part discusses the merits of the labor movement's
Thirteenth Amendment claims, focusing on precedent, text, and original
meaning. It also considers the relationship between the freedom of association
and the thrust of the Thirteenth Amendment toward racial equality.
A. The Supreme Court: A "Momentous" Question Unanswered
In the 1923 case of Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
the Supreme Court held that workers do enjoy the constitutional right to
strike - applying reasoning similar to that of Bailey and Pollock - but under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court invalidated the
wage-fixing provisions of a state law that prohibited strikes in key industries
and established an industrial court to resolve the underlying disputes. The
Court reasoned, in part, that the worker was "forbidden, on penalty of fine or
imprisonment, to strike against" the wages fixed, and thus was "compelled to
give up that means of putting himself on an equality with his employer which
action in concert with his fellows gives him. "1267 The Court reached this
conclusion despite the fact that the state law expressly affirmed the individual
right to quit? 68 The challenge was brought by an employer, but the Court
opined that the law's requirement of continuous production imposed a "more
drastic exercise of control" on the worker than on the owner, and declared that
such a requirement could not be forced on either in the absence of "a
conventional relation to the public somewhat equivalent to the appointment of
officers and the enlistment of soldiers and sailors in military service. ",, 69 Even
Felix Frankfurter, a relentless foe of the labor movement's Thirteenth
REV. 518, 520-39, 542-44 (2004) (discussing the influence of NLRA's Commerce Clause
foundation on the results in Fansteel, Mackay, Consolidated Edison, and Babcock & Wilcox).
266. Cox, supra note 7, at 576-77.
267. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 540 (1923).
268. Id. at 534.
269. Id. at 541; cf. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (upholding the military
draft against a Thirteenth Amendment challenge on the ground that the "supreme and
noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation" could not be
equated with involuntary servitude).
1542
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Amendment claims, acknowledged that "[t]he right to strike, generally, is in
the Wolff Packing Company case recognized as a constitutional right."
2 70
From our vantage point today, Wolff Packing's holding on the right to
strike appears far more compatible with Thirteenth than with Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court echoed the
Thirteenth Amendment ruling in Bailey v. Alabama while departing sharply
from the contemporary Fourteenth Amendment cases. As in Bailey, the claimed
right was justified in terms of its capacity to counter employer domination. To
Taft, the worker's right to strike was "a most important element of his freedom
of labor."271 Why? Because it gave him a "means of putting himself on an
equality with his employer. 2 7' This positive, constitutional valuation of actual
equality, consistent with the Bailey Court's focus on preventing the "coercion"
of employees to the benefit of employers, found no analogue in the Fourteenth
Amendment labor decisions. In cases like Coppage v. Kansas and Lochner v. New
York, individual freedom of contract was the sine qua non of labor freedom,
while the inequality between workers and employers was not only "natural,"
but "legitimate." The Court went so far as to hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment barred government from attempting to remedy such
inequalities. 73
Wolff Packing's holding on the constitutional right to strike has been
ignored for more than half a century. Its anchorage in Fourteenth Amendment
economic due process, never secure, has altogether washed away. Nevertheless,
the holding has never been overruled. 4 Justice Louis Brandeis's subsequent
opinion for the Court in Dorchy v. Kansas denied that the Fourteenth
270. Felix Frankfurter, Exit the Kansas Court, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT:
EXTRAJUDIciAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 140, 141 (Philip B. Kurland
ed., 1970) (reprinting Frankfurter's unsigned editorial from the New Republic, June 27,
1923).
271. WolffPacking, 262 U.S. at 542.
272. Id. at 540.
273. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (striking down a ban on yellow dog
contracts, reasoning that "it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights");
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (19o5) (invalidating a maximum hours law for bakers
and asserting that "[t]here is no reasonable ground" for interfering with bakers' right of free
contract because there "is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence
and capacity to men in other trades" or that bakers are "wards of the State").
274. Wolff Packing's holdings on price-fixing and wage-fixing were later overruled during the
retreat from Lochner-era substantive due process, but not the holding on the right to strike.
See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 & n.6 (1949).
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Amendment conferred the "absolute right to strike," but few, if any,
constitutional rights are "absolute. 2 75 One year after Dorchy, for example,
Brandeis pointed out - in the midst of a paean to the First Amendment - that
"although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not
in their nature absolute. ''276 As the free speech example indicates, there is
plenty of room for meaningful protection of a right short of treating it as
"absolute." Today, Wolff Packing remains available as authority for the
proposition that there is a constitutional right to strike, and one that flows
from concerns about the balance of power in dealings between workers and
employers.
Meanwhile, labor's claim of a Thirteenth Amendment right to strike-
though labeled "momentous" by Justices Wiley Rutledge and Frank Murphy in
1949- has never been squarely resolved. 27 The Court came closest in UAW
Local 232 V. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (WERC), which involved a
state statute barring workers from engaging in "any concerted effort to
interfere with production except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner
for the purpose of going on strike. ''278 The Court held that the Thirteenth
Amendment did not prohibit a state from outlawing intermittent,
unannounced strikes, and explained:
The Union contends that the statute as thus applied violates the
Thirteenth Amendment in that it imposes a form of compulsory service
or involuntary servitude. However, nothing in the statute or the order
makes it a crime to abandon work individually (compare Pollock v.
Williams, 322 U.S. 4) or collectively. Nor does either undertake to
prohibit or restrict any employee from leaving the service of the
employer, either for reason or without reason, either with or without
notice. The facts afford no foundation for the contention that any
275. 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926). In Dorchy, Justice Brandeis framed the issue narrowly as whether a
state could prohibit a strike called to collect a former employee's two-year old wage claim,
and concluded that "[t]o collect a stale claim due to a fellow member of the union who was
formerly employed in the business is not a permissible purpose" for a strike. Id. at 309, 311.
The Thirteenth Amendment was missing both from the Court's opinion and from Dorchy's
brief. Id. at 306; Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 8-13, Dorchy, 272 U.S. 306 (No. 119).
276. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
z77. AFL v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J.,
concurring in Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949)); Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 260, at 104 nn.536-37, 112.
278. 336 U.S. 245, 247 n.1 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. WERC, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). The Wisconsin State Employment
Relations Board issued an order incorporating this language. Id. at 250.
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action of the State has the purpose or effect of imposing any form of
involuntary servitude.
279
WERC held that the Thirteenth Amendment does not protect quickie
strikes, but reserves the question of a Thirteenth Amendment right to
"abandon work. . . collectively." The word "abandon" (as opposed to "cease"
or "stop") could be read to suggest that the Court was referring only to a
permanent quitting of work as opposed to a strike, in which workers cease
work temporarily pending a settlement of their demands. However, in the
sentence immediately preceding the quoted paragraph, the Court announced
that the "only question" at issue was whether Wisconsin could "prohibit the
particular course of conduct described," namely a series of brief, unannounced
work stoppages."' By contrast, the Wisconsin statute exempted "leaving the
premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike," the likely
referent for "abandon work... collectively. " "1 Thus, WERC appears to hold
out the possibility that there is a Thirteenth Amendment right to strike, in the
sense of withdrawing from work in a body with the objective of obtaining
concessions from the employer'
82
Although the Court has never resolved the issue, there are a host of
decisions announcing results that are inconsistent with the existence of any
meaningful Thirteenth Amendment right to strike. The Court has, for
example, upheld the privilege of employers to permanently replace economic
strikers, sustained a ban on secondary strikes, and upheld a flat prohibition of
public employee strikes.2s3 Because the Thirteenth Amendment issue was not
discussed, however, there is no way of divining a conclusion on it. Had the
Justices considered it, they could have rejected the constitutional claim
altogether, or recognized the right to strike while deferring to Congress in the
definition of its scope, or recognized the right and invalidated the statute. The
last time that the Court addressed any claim of a constitutional right to strike,
it assumed that the right existed but held that the statute at issue (which
279. Id. at 251.
z8o. Id.
281. Id. at 250,251.
282. Alfred Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment
Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 228, 244 (1964); Seth
Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REv. 685, 734 (1985).
283. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951); NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp.
879 (D.D.C.), affd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
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denied food stamps to the families of striking workers) did not violate the
right.2
84
B. Lower Courts: Limiting the Involuntary Servitude Clause to Market Rights
While the Supreme Court avoided the question, state and lower federal
courts initially gave conflicting answers. Some invoked the Thirteenth
Amendment as a justification for overturning antistrike injunctions and
statutory strike prohibitions.28 By the 1950s, however, a growing majority held
that the Amendment did not reach the right to strike, either because strikers
ceased work collectively instead of individually,286 or because they quit work
temporarily instead of permanently, s7 or because the restriction at issue did
not interfere directly with the right to cease work collectively. 88 None of the
284. Lyng v. Int'l Union of Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988) (reasoning that "the
strikers' right of association does not require the Government to furnish funds to maximize
the exercise of that right").
285. See United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845, 849-50 (N.D. Ill. 1946), rev'd, 332 U.S. 1
(1947) (citing the Thirteenth Amendment to justify overturning provision of the Federal
Communications Act that banned strikes in the radio industry); Henderson v. Coleman, 7
So. 2d 117, 121 (Fla. 1942) (construing an injunction not to compel union workers to unload
nonunion trucks on the ground that a contrary reading would impose involuntary servitude
within the meaning of the Involuntary Servitude Clause of the Florida state constitution);
Kemp v. Division No. 241, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street & Elec. Ry. Employees of Am., 99
N.E. 389, 392 (Ill. 1912) (overturning an injunction against strike called to protest
employment of nonunion members, reasoning in part that "the right of every workman to
refuse to work with any co-employee who is for any reason objectionable to him, provided
his refusal does not violate his contract with his employer" is "[i]ncident" to the Thirteenth
Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude); State ex rel. Dairyland Power
Coop. v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2508, 2510 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
1948) (holding that a statute prohibiting strikes by employees of public utilities violated the
Thirteenth Amendment).
286. See New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, ILA Local Union No. 1418, 626
F.2d 455, 463 (sth Cir. 198o), affd sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982); Itasca Lodge 2029 v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc.,
391 F.2d 657, 663 (8th Cir. 1968); Fr. Packing Co. v. Dailey, 166 F.2d 751, 753-54 (3d Cir.
1948); Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Floor Decorators' Union, 39 N.W.2d
183, 197 (Minn. 1949), app. dismissed, 339 U.S. 906 (195o); State v. Local No. 8-6, Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 317 S.W.2d 309, 325 (Mo. 1958). The Dayton Court
explained that the appeal was "dismissed for the reason that the judgment of the court
below is based upon a non-federal ground adequate to support it." 339 U.S. at 906.
287. See United States v. Martinez, 686 F.2d 334, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1982); Fr. Packing Co., 166 F.2d
at 753-54.
88. See NLRB v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 181 F.2d 126, 132 (6th
Cir. 1950) (reasoning that the "order of the Labor Board directs the respondent union and
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lower court opinions - pro or con - contained any reasoning to explain why the
right to strike either was or was not necessary to negate a condition of
involuntary servitude.28 9 The potentially relevant Supreme Court precedents of
Bailey, Pollock, and Wolff Packing were either ignored altogether or -rarely -
cited for one side or the other with no explanation. One court, for example,
invalidated a strike injunction and quoted Bailey's language concerning the
essence of involuntary servitude (namely "that control by which the personal
service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit"), but
neglected to explain how the quoted language applied to a strike injunction as
opposed to the peonage law involved in Bailey.290 Another court upheld an
NLRB order barring union officials from calling a strike and distinguished
Pollock on the ground that the order did not "expressly forbid employees to
leave their jobs, individually or in concert." The court failed, however, to
explain why that factual distinction should make a legal difference in light of
the claim that the NLRB order deprived workers of the "power below" and
employers of the "incentive above" to avoid servitude. 9' If, as the Supreme
Court once opined, "a decision without principled justification would be no
judicial act at all,"' 92 then none of the on-point decisions-pro or con-would
seem to carry any precedential weight. More modestly, they certainly would
not "foreclose" the recognition of rights based on an analysis of the text,
original meaning, and history-the standard recently applied by the Supreme
Court with regard to precedent concerning the Second Amendment right to
bear arms. 9 '
its business agent, and not the union members themselves" to cease from striking or
inducing others to strike), affd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 707 (1951); NLRB v. National
Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1949) (reasoning that "the Board's order does
not expressly forbid employees to leave their jobs, individually or in concert" and that it "is
directed only against the Union and its agents").
289. The one exception was the concurring opinion of California Chief Justice Rose Bird in
County Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Association, Local 660, 699
P.2d 835 (Cal. 1985). The court overturned California's common law ban on public
employee strikes, partly to avoid constitutional questions. Id. at 854. Judge Bird elaborated
extensively on the constitutional point, relying partly on Bailey and Pollock in concluding
that the strike ban violated the California Constitution. Id. at 858-59 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
290. United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845, 849 (N.D. Ill. 1946) (quoting Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)), rev'd on other grounds, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
2g. NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1949).
292. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
293. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2812-16 (2008).
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C. The Freedom ofAssociation and the Question of Power
Had the courts wished to provide a justification for the majority position,
they might have pointed out that the distinction between an individual
permanently quitting work, on the one hand, and a group of workers
temporarily quitting work, on the other, tracks the distinction between the
market mechanism of exit and the political mechanism of voice.2 94 The rights
of the individual to quit work, change employers, and name her wages are
market rights. They operate not through conscious, organized pressure, but
through the "invisible hand" of the labor market. If enough workers quit an
employer and go elsewhere, that employer will have an "incentive above" (in
the language of Pollock) to raise wages and improve conditions. By the time
that the employer changes its policies, the workers who exerted their "power
below" are working for other employers. By contrast, strikers claim to retain
their status as employees. Instead of exiting the employment relation and
seeking better terms on the market, they cease work temporarily and
collectively with the aim of pressuring their employer to improve the terms and
conditions of employment. The strike is, literally, a concerted quitting of work,
but it does not gain its effectiveness from the operation of market mechanisms.
To the contrary, it hinges on insulating the affected jobs from market
competition through norms of solidarity nurtured in communities and
associations, and enforced by picketing, social disapproval, and other means.
Without strong solidarity, workers compete with each other, undermining the
collective demands.
Clearly, then, there is an intelligible distinction between an individual
permanently quitting her job and a group of workers temporarily withholding
labor until their employer changes its policies. For Thirteenth Amendment
purposes, however, the significance of this distinction hinges on whether
nonmarket rights are necessary to prevent involuntary servitude. The text of
the Amendment flatly prohibits involuntary servitude and contains no
limitation to market rights. If, as suggested in Part III above, Bailey and Pollock
set forth the appropriate principle for the assessment of labor rights claims
under the Thirteenth Amendment, then the issue hinges on whether
nonmarket rights are necessary to provide workers with the "power below" and
employers the "incentive above" to avoid a "harsh overlordship or
unwholesome conditions of work."29
294. On this distinction, see RiCHARD FREEMAN & JAMEs L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do? 6-11
(1984); and ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VoicE AND LOYALTY (1970).
295. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); see generally supra Section V.D. (considering when
nonmarket fights are constitutionally necessary and what those rights might be).
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It is clear, however, that there is strong resistance to the notion of applying
Bailey or Pollock to nonmarket rights. As we have seen, numerous courts have
declined to do so. Moreover, they have done so in a peremptory way, refusing
to dignify labor's arguments with a response on the merits.296 Why? Perhaps
judges are worried that the Pollock standard would entangle them in difficult
judgments about economic and social policy that are best left to the legislative
branch, a concern discussed above in Section IV.C. Another possibility,
however, is that the judges concur with Edward Corwin, the United States'
leading constitutional scholar of the mid-twentieth century, who rejected the
claim of a constitutional right to strike by quoting Edmund Burke: "Liberty is
an individual matter; for as Edmund Burke remarks in the Reflections, 'When
men act in concert, liberty is power.""'29 This objection taps into a resilient
strand of American individualism, according to which collective labor
organization and action is inherently suspect.298
In the 1940s, when Corwin invoked Burke and the Supreme Court dodged
labor's Thirteenth Amendment claims, there was no constitutional concept of a
freedom of association 9 Since then, however, individuals have gained the
freedom to associate in the exercise of advocacy rights, and advocacy
organizations have come to enjoy the full protection of the First
Amendment."°° Individual consumers may join together to boycott products or
companies. 0 1 According to the doctrine developed in these cases, claimants
must prove first that they are doing something that they have a constitutional
right to do, and second that if they are prohibited from doing it in
296. See supra Section VI.B.
297. EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 91 (1947) (quoting EDMUND
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 7 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Penguin 2004)
(1790)).
298. See, e.g., ROBERT FRANKLIN HoxiE, TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 23, 30 (1922)
(observing that American law is so permeated with individualism that unionism "conflicts
with the legal theory upon which our social and industrial system is based and with the
established law and order"); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS:
LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 188o-196o, at
xiii (1985) (suggesting that collective labor action has never achieved more than "contingent
legitimacy" in the United States).
299. The first mentions of a constitutional freedom of association came in the 195os, in cases
involving investigations of communism. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
245, 250 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Earlier cases had dealt with facts that we now recognize as involving the issue, but the
concept was lacking.
300. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981).
3o. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-15 (1982).
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combination, their exercise of the right will be rendered ineffective.3 °2 Workers
and unions prefigured these elements in their case for the Thirteenth
Amendment right to strike. They maintained that (1) employees enjoy the
Thirteenth Amendment right to quit individually; and (2) if they are
prohibited from exercising that right in combination, then the whole point of
the right to quit-preventing a "harsh overlordship" or "unwholesome
conditions of work" -is defeated." 3 The first element is not disputed, and the
second finds support in statements by both Congress and the Supreme Court
that the individual unorganized worker is "helpless" in dealings with an
employer, unable to exercise real liberty of contract or to protect her freedom of
labor.30 4 Since the development of the doctrine, the Court has not heard a
Thirteenth Amendment argument for the right to strike. (In one case, as noted
above, the Court assumed arguendo that workers enjoyed the right to strike
under the First Amendment, but ruled that the restraint at issue did not violate
the right.)3"'
How, then, can the majority rule be justified? It has been argued that
workers gain disproportionate power through concerted activity. Compared to
consumer boycotters, for example, strikers enjoy "specialized and very unequal
market power." 36 But the relevant comparison for Thirteenth Amendment
purposes is not consumers, but employers. In a nation of employees, labor
liberty must rest on power. Even the right to quit no longer functions by
enabling individuals to escape servitude; when it is working well, it provides
them with the "power below" to raise employment above servitude. Each
individual quits alone, but it is the combined effect of many individual actions
that gives employers the "incentive above" to provide decent conditions.
Admittedly, there are important differences between power collectively
exerted and power that results from uncoordinated, individual actions. Those
differences have sparked intense controversy since the days of labor conspiracy
302. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 46o-61 (1958); SHELDON LEADER,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND POLrICAL THEORY 22-23 (1992).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 260-261.
304. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 33 (1937); Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209
(1921) (Taft, C.J.). This is the standard way of getting to the freedom of association in
American constitutional law.
305. Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988) (upholding denial of food stamps to families
of strikers on the ground that "the strikers' right of association does not require the
Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that right").
306. Michael C. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right To Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware and Its ImplicationsforAmerican Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 426-29 (1984).
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prosecutions. In the economic sphere, labor organization is said by some to
interfere with market competition and thus economic efficiency, but by others
to promote efficiency by apprising management of employee preferences and
the realities of the labor process. 7 In the political sphere, labor organizations
are said by some to function as "special interest groups" promoting legislation
against the public interest, but by others to exert a countervailing power to
business corporations that is essential to democracy." 8 Many employers find it
far easier to accept the verdict of impersonal market mechanisms than to sit
down and bargain on an equal basis with organized workers and, conversely,
many workers consider quitting to be a mute and futile mode of expressing
discontent as compared to concerted action and negotiation.3"9
None of these considerations, however, can relieve a conscientious
constitutionalist of the duty to determine whether the rights to organize and
strike are necessary to enable workers to avoid involuntary servitude. In
particular, none can justify cutting off the inquiry at the line between market
and nonmarket rights, as in: "Collective labor rights are so bad for economic
efficiency that I decline to consider whether they are necessary to prevent
involuntary servitude"; or: "Collective labor rights are so bad for economic
efficiency that I will interpret the phrase 'involuntary servitude' with
efficiency-and not labor freedom-primarily in mind." Given the currently
prevailing view that southern slave labor was about as efficient as northern free
labor, it would be exceedingly dangerous to vary the test for involuntary
servitude depending upon the perceived economic efficiency of a challenged
form of labor control.310 The same goes for other policies that might conflict
with a ban on involuntary servitude. The Constitution prohibits all involuntary
servitude, and not just involuntary servitude that comports with economic
efficiency and other values. If the test that produced the rights to quit and to
change employers is appropriate for market rights, then it should be applicable
to nonmarket rights as well.
307. See, e.g., John T. Addison & Clive R. Belfield, Union Voice, in WHAT DO UNIONS Do?: A
TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 238, 238-74 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007);
Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?, in WHAT Do UNIONS Do?,
supra, at 193, 193-237.
308. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 115-57 (1952) (setting out the theory of countervailing power);
Henry C. Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 1, 23 (1944) (discussing
special interest groups).
309. See, e.g., NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 6-7,
105-08 (2002).
310. See Robert Whaples, Where Is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The
Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions, 55 J. ECON. HiST. 139, 141 (1995).
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D. Pollock Applied to the Rights To Organize and Strike
The case for the rights to organize and strike under Pollock is simple and
straightforward. As Archibald Cox observed, "it may be urged with
considerable force that in terms of the purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment
the strike is the modern counterpart of the right to change employers. '311 In
other legal contexts, both the Supreme Court and Congress have rejected the
sufficiency of market rights and endorsed the need for organized pressure to
ensure basic labor freedom. According to the Court, a single employee without
organization
was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily
on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the
employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and
unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on equality with their employer.312
As noted above, the Court made a similar point to justify its invalidation of
a state strike ban on substantive due process grounds. 3 Congress endorsed
this view in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which eliminated federal court
jurisdiction to enforce yellow dog contracts (agreements not to join a union) or
to enjoin peaceful strikes and picketing. According to the Court, "the individual
unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and
conditions of employment. '314 In the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
which barred employers from interfering with the rights to organize and
engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, Congress likewise
decried the "inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers
who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association."
315
311. Cox, supra note 7, at 577.
312. Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (Taft, C.J.);
see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (paraphrasing this
language).
313. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 540 (1923); see supra
notes 271-272 and accompanying text.
314. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
315. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 151.
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Although Congress did not ground these laws on the Thirteenth
Amendment, prominent proponents did embrace the substance of labor's claim
that without the rights to organize and strike, workers would be reduced to
slavery or involuntary servitude. Senator George Norris, who oversaw the
drafting of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, charged that labor injunctions brought
about "involuntary servitude on the part of those who must toil in order that
they and their families may live.",, 6 Senator Robert Wagner, who shaped the
National Labor Relations Act, maintained that in view of the "economic
duress" imposed on individual workers by large corporations, "the right to
bargain collectively.., is a veritable charter of freedom of contract; without it
there would be slavery by contract."3 17 These themes ran through the
congressional debates on both bills.3'8
During the 194os and 1950s, legislative attention turned to abuses of union
power, but these core principles were not challenged.319 Today, the rights to
organize and strike are generally recognized in first-wave industrialized nations
316. 75 CONG. REC. 4502 (1932). During the Congressional hearings, Norris had defended labor's
view that injunctions prohibiting workers from combining to quit work violated the
Thirteenth Amendment. See Limiting Scope of Injunctions in Labor Disputes: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 7oth Cong. 672 (1928).
317. 78 CONG. REC. 3679 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LFGISLATivF
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 20 (1985).
318. On the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see 75 CONG. REC. 5493 (1932) (statement of Rep. Garber)
(contending that the continued use of yellow dog contracts "will finally destroy the labor
organizations, the independence of the worker, and create a general labor condition of
involuntary servitude"); id. at 5489 (statement of Rep. Celler) (asserting that if a worker
.must accept the company union or 'yellow-dog' contract, he is being forced into
'involuntary servitude'"); id. at 5487 (statement of Rep. Sparks) (charging that yellow dog
contracts "seek the enslavement of the laborer by rendering him helpless to protect his own
interests"); id. at 5481 (statement of Rep. Oliver) ("This bill says that a federal court shall
not.., bring down into slavery those who are attempting to negotiate for what they believe
to be the necessities of their lives and the happiness of their children."); id. at 5467
(statement of Rep. Nelson) (charging that labor injunctions "have become intolerable and
un-American, in many cases reducing the workers to a state of economic slavery"); and id. at
5464 (1932) (statement of Rep. O'Connor) (arguing that under yellow dog contracts, "the
worker practically enters into 'involuntary servitude'"). For similar quotations from the
debates over the National Labor Relations Act, see ZIETLOW, supra note 2, at 75; and Pope,
The Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 260, at 48-49 nn.227-28.
319. The last time the government conducted a serious inquiry into industrial relations policy,
even the employer representatives who testified endorsed the basic principle that workers
should enjoy "'frill freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing.'" U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FAcT FINDING REPORT: COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
63 (1994) (quoting the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
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and enshrined in international law as fundamental human rights . 20 The
Supreme Court of Canada recently repudiated its own precedents and held for
the first time that the right of collective bargaining is protected under the
Canadian Charter of Rights, quoting the U.S. Supreme Court's observation
that a single, unorganized employee was "helpless in dealing with an
employer."3 ' Although the salience of non-U.S. law to American jurisprudence
is disputed, the continued vitality of these rights internationally demonstrates
that the conclusions reached by Congress and the Court in the twentieth
century reflect more than a temporary political victory for organized labor or a
time-bound response to employment conditions generated by mass production
industry.
32 2
It might be argued that-however weighty the supporting authorities
might be-Congress and the Supreme Court were simply wrong when they
asserted that the freedom of association was necessary to protect labor liberty.
According to some scholars writing in the vein of neoclassical law and
economics, for example, individual bargaining suffices to protect the legitimate
interests of workers. If employers fail to provide workers with the full value of
their labor (a commonly stated goal of the Thirteenth Amendment), then the
workers will quit and go elsewhere. 23 This claim, however, fails to confront a
fundamental difference between labor markets and ordinary commodity
markets, namely that labor power is a human capacity and not a commodity
320. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 13-14 (2000);
TONIA NOVITZ, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STANDARDS SET BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION,THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2003).
321. Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, 440 (Can.), (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 33 (1937)), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2oo7/2oo7scc27/2oo7scc27.html.
322. For more on the philosophical and economic justifications for these rights, see, for example,
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984); JOSIAH BARTLETT
LAMBERT, "IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION": THE RIGHT To STRIKE AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2005); SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN
LABOR LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992); WILLIAM M. REDDY, MONEY AND LIBERTY IN
MODERN EUROPE: A CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 64-73 (1987); and
WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (James A. Gross ed., 2003). For a critical intellectual
history of the issue written from a viewpoint sympathetic to libertarianism, see HowARD
DICKMAN, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS POLICY (1987).
323. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1370-72, 1382 (1983). On the Thirteenth Amendment's
goal of ensuring that the laborer would receive the full value of her labor, see supra note 247.
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produced for sale.3" Because labor is inseparable from the human mind and
body, workers face serious structural disadvantages in bargaining with
employers. Workers cannot, for example, control the supply of their fictive
commodity. Labor power is produced not strategically for exchange on the
market, but nonstrategically according to the biological processes and social
customs that shape human reproduction. 3" Nor can workers temporarily
remove their labor power from the market, for it perishes each day and must be
continuously sustained through the provision of food, shelter, health care, and
other necessities.36 Under ordinary conditions, then, workers experience far
greater pressure than employers to reach a deal. The departure of any
particular employee will not seriously affect the employer's revenue stream,
while the individual worker will lose her entire income. The consequences are
immediate and dire for the worker, who needs her paycheck to obtain the basic
necessities of life for herself and her dependents, but merely inconvenient for
most employers, who can fall back on financial reserves.32 7 Compounding these
324. KARL POLANYi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 72-73 (1957); Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor Law
and Employment Regulation: Neoclassical and Institutional Perspectives, in LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 27 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Seth D. Harris & Orly
Lobel eds., 20o9). This principle is embodied in international law, as the first of four
"fundamental principles on which the [International Labour] Organization is based," and in
U.S. law as one of several statutory provisions exempting labor from the antitrust statutes.
Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organisation,
Constitution of the International Labour Organization, annex, art. 1, § (a) (declaring that
"labour is not a commodity"); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006)) ("The labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce.").
325. CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM: CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF WORK AND
POLITICS 16 (1985); Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF
LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 37, 54-55 (Guy Davidov &
Brian Langille eds., 2006). Even if parents wanted to act strategically, they would face huge
information costs attempting to predict the supply and demand for labor eighteen or sixteen
or even twelve years in the future.
326. OFFE, supra note 325, at 17, 20; Kaufman, supra note 324, at 38-39; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt
& Arthur R. Traynor, Regulating Unions and Collective Bargaining, in LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAw AND ECONOMICS, supra note 323, at 96, 107. The requirements of
subsistence hinge on the conditions in a particular society. In the United States today, for
example, motorized transportation (whether public or private) to and from food stores,
health care providers, and work is a necessity for most people.
327. REDDY, supra note 321 at 64-73; Kaufman, supra note 323, at 30-34; see also Am. Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (observing that
because the individual employee was "dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the
maintenance of himself and family," he was "unable to leave the employ and to resist
arbitrary and unfair treatment"); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS S8 (Everyman's
Library 191o) (1776) (suggesting that in disputes with labor, "the masters can hold out
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imbalances, the human character of labor imposes severe constraints on its
geographic and industrial mobility. While inanimate commodities and capital
can be shifted from one location to another without disrupting the lives of their
owners, workers must move themselves along with their labor power,
abandoning support networks in local communities and associations, and
forcing family members either to relocate or accept separation. Further, while
inanimate commodities and capital can be converted to cash and shifted to
other industries, human beings cannot be liquidated; the workers' closest
equivalent would be unlimited retraining.32 And because workers cannot
control the supply of their "commodity," employers "typically face more
alternative job seekers than individual workers face alternative job openings
(that is, workers are usually on the 'long side' of the labor market)."329 Most
employers also enjoy huge advantages in information. To the extent that there
is any actual bargaining between an individual worker and a corporate
employer, the worker typically faces a "human resources" professional with
access to relevant market information and guidance from policies developed by
corporate economists at the national and international level; only through
organization can workers obtain similar levels of knowledge.33° Finally,
although both employers and workers constantly seek to enhance strategic
control through organization, the "masters, being fewer in number, can
combine much more easily."33' All of these factors point toward the inadequacy
of individual quits, and none has been satisfactorily answered by scholars of
neoclassical law and economics.332
much longer" because they "could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they
have already acquired" while "[m]any workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist
a month, and scarce any a year without employment").
328. OFFE, supra note 325, at 19. It has been suggested that, because of these constraints on labor
mobility, employers may gain monopsonistic market power (monopsony being the
equivalent of monopoly, but on the purchasing side) even when they are not alone in the
relevant labor market. Dau-Schmidt & Traynor, supra note 326, at 1o8 (citing ALAN
MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR MARKETS (2003)).
329. Kaufman, supra note 324, at 34; Curtis Taylor, The Long Side of the Market and the Short End
of the Stick: Bargaining Power and Price Formation in Buyers, Sellers, and Balanced Markets,
11o QJ. ECON. 837 (1995); see also Hyde, supra note 325, at 55 ("The inability of sellers to
restrict supply necessarily drives prices down and prevents labour markets from clearing;
there will always be unemployed people.").
33o. Hyde, supra note 325, at 57.
331. SMITH, supra note 327, at 58.
332. More fundamentally, recent scholarship suggests that neoclassical economics is incapable of
comprehending the labor market because its root assumption of a smoothly functioning
market characterized by zero (or close to zero) transaction costs is belied by the very
existence of the employment relation -a command-based and nontransactional system of
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E. The Right To Strike and the Original Meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment
Scholars as divergent in viewpoint as Robert Bork and Ronald Dworkin
have stressed that an inquiry into original meaning should focus on identifying
the principles embodied in a constitutional text, and not on reconstructing how
the Framers would have applied the text to the facts of their time.333 In Part III
supra, I argued that the Pollock principle is consistent with the original meaning
of the Thirteenth Amendment. If that conclusion is correct, then the analysis
above - which applies the Pollock principle to the right to strike - is supported
by the original meaning.
Also relevant, however, is the more specific question of whether the ban on
involuntary servitude was understood by the Framers and Ratifiers to protect
the rights to organize and strike. The Framers' opinions about specific
applications can provide evidence as to the principles embodied in the text. As
we have seen, for example, the Framers' positions on the rights to quit
(especially in the context of peonage in New Mexico), to change employers,
and to set wages are helpful in ascertaining the principle that they embodied in
the Involuntary Servitude Clause. Their views on the rights to organize and
strike, if known, could be similarly useful.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that the rights to organize and strike
attracted much attention at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment's
enactment. Nobody is recorded as mentioning them during the debates, and
there appears to have been only one related reference during the discussions on
legislation to enforce them. Senator Charles Sumner spoke in favor of a lengthy
list of rights that would be "essential to complete Emancipation" among which
labor extraction that would never have arisen in the absence of serious market malfunctions.
Kaufman, supra note 324, at 28-29. Kaufman relies partly on Ronald Coase's conclusion that,
"'[i]n the absence of transaction cost, there is no economic basis for the existence of the
firm."' Id. at 28; see also Bruce Kaufman, The Non-Existence of the Labor Demand/Supply
Diagram, and Other Theorems of Institutional Economics, 29 J. LAB. REs. 285 (2008)
(contending that employment relations come into existence only as responses to market
failure).
333. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLrrICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
144-49 (1990); RONALD DWORKiN, FREEDOM's LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7-8 (1996). On this view, for example, courts should ask not
whether the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to abolish segregation in
education given the facts of their time, but whether the principle embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment, as understood at that time, is violated by segregation given the
facts of our time.
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was the right to join a craft guild. 34 The list, however, sparked no recorded
discussion.
What about the legal status of the strike in 1865? It is sometimes thought
that the Framers and Ratifiers of a constitutional provision could not have
meant to protect a right that was denied at the time.33 During the early decades
of the century, many strike activities were punished under the doctrine of
criminal conspiracy. In 1842, however, Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw's landmark opinion in Commonwealth v. Hunt announced that henceforth
combinations to raise wages would be legal provided the strikers were not
employing "unlawful means" or pursuing an "unlawful purpose.",, 6 Although
Hunt was no ringing declaration of the right to strike, it did have the effect of
eliminating conspiracy prosecutions outside the South until after the Civil
War.337 During the war, a few states enacted antistrike laws and some Union
Army generals ordered their troops to break strikes in war industries."'
However, these measures reflected a perception of military necessity and did
not challenge the general rule of Hunt.339 The army officers acted without the
knowledge or authorization of President Lincoln who, in one case, reportedly
ended the intervention by ordering the troops not to "interfere with the
legitimate demands of labor. 340
334. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1865). This list was drawn from the proclamation of
the Czar of Russia emancipating the serfs, see Czar Alexander II, Edict of Emancipation
(1861).
335. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174-75 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977).
336. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842); Walter Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COLUM. L. REv.
1128 (1932).
337. See VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE ORIGINS OF BUSINESS
UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 67-68 (1993); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND
THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA,
188o-196o, at 44 (1985); Henry E. Hoagland, Humanitarianism (184o-186o), in 1 JOHN R.
COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 487, 611-13 (1918).
338. DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 1862-1872,
at 98-1Ol (1967); GRACE PALLADINO, ANOTHER CIVIL WAR: LABOR, CAPITAL, AND THE STATE
IN THE ANTHRACITE REGIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA 1840-68, at 169-70 (1990).
339- If wartime practice were the standard for protecting rights in peacetime, few rights would be
secure. See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES (1983) (recounting the systematic violation of the constitutional rights
of Japanese Americans during World War II); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004)
(describing the abrogation of free speech protections in wartime due to understandable but
unwarranted fears).
34o. G.S. BoRrEr, LINCOLN AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 220 (1978).
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The most revealing discussion of the strike issue occurred in 186o, thirteen
months before the outbreak of civil war, when more than twenty thousand
Massachusetts shoemakers staged the largest strike in United States history to
date. On banners and in speeches and song, the strikers proclaimed that they
would "NOT BE SLAVES," and accused their employers of "drawing the
chains of slavery, and riveting them closer and closer around the limbs of free
laboring men."'" The reaction of Republican politicians and intellectuals, who
would soon be leading the nation through civil war and reconstruction, was
remarkably consistent. Most agreed that the strike was unwise, because wages
would rise only through the natural operation of supply and demand. 42
Nevertheless, they claimed the strike as evidence that northern factory laborers
enjoyed more freedom than southern slaves. 43 Many joined with the editor of
the Newark Advertiser in embracing "the right to strike for better wages," while
questioning whether the Lynn strike was "expedient."344 While proslavery
Democrats offered the strike as proof that class conflict was endemic to the free
labor system, Republicans suggested that it demonstrated the relative equality
of bargaining power between free laborers and capitalists. 4' Speaking in
nearby Connecticut, presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln expressed the
view of many Republicans:
At the outset, I am glad to see that a system of labor prevails in New
England under which laborers CAN strike when they want to, where they
are not obliged to work under all circumstances, and are not tied down
and obliged to labor whether you pay them or not! I like the system
which lets a man quit when he wants to, and wish it might prevail
everywhere. One of the reasons why I am opposed to Slavery is just
here.346
It has been suggested that Lincoln's version of the right to strike
encompassed nothing more than "the right to quit and 'go somewhere else.'
347
This conclusion is consistent with many of Lincoln's statements on the labor
341. ALAN DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN 82 (1976).
342. James L. Huston, Facing an Angry Labor: The American Public Interprets the Shoemakers' Strike
of186o, 28 CIv. WAR HIST. 197, 205-06 (1982).
343. Id. at 202 (reporting the results of a study of contemporary newspaper reports and
commentary on the strike).
344, Id. at 204.
345. Id.
346. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 218, at 24.
347. BERNARD MANDEL, LABOR: FREE AND SLAVE 159 (1955).
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question. The plight of northern factory labor was a major topic in the debates
over slavery, as southerners charged that capitalism was a more ruthless system
of labor exploitation than slavery.H4 In response, Lincoln usually stressed
escape from the employment relation, not organized protest within.
Immediately following the statement on the shoe strike quoted above, for
example, Lincoln declared that under "the true system," every man could "hope
to be a hired laborer this year and the next, work for himself afterward, and
finally to hire men to work for him!" 9 If he could not find success in one
region, he could "strike and go somewhere else."3"' Based on his perception
that the relation between capital and labor encompassed only "one-eighth of
the labor of the country," Lincoln was confident that the wage worker of today
would become the independent free laborer of tomorrow." '
On the other hand, Lincoln endorsed the system of labor under which
"laborers CAN strike" in the midst of a real-life strike. It was obvious that the
Massachusetts shoemakers were not quitting their jobs to "go somewhere else."
They were temporarily and collectively ceasing work to pressure their employer
into granting better terms and conditions of employment."' Lincoln spoke less
than two weeks after extensive news coverage of clashes between strikers and
armed state militia and police. Later, during his presidency, Lincoln received
delegations of striking workers and-according to their reports -invariably
expressed support, once going so far as to opine that "in almost every case of
strikes, the men have just cause for complaint."" 3 It appears, then, that Lincoln
expected most workers to escape employment and go into business for
themselves, but also supported the right of those left behind to organize and
strike. Influential Republican thinkers like Horace Greeley and E.L. Godkin
likewise endorsed labor organization as essential to effective labor freedom.
35 4
Based on the public discussion, northern workers might reasonably have
thought that the right to strike was a recognized component of the free labor
system that they would soon be mustered to defend. There is, however, no
348. STANLEY, supra note 114, at 19-20.
349. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 218, at 24-25.
350. Id. at 24.
351. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 218, at 364; 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 218, at 459.
352. BOR1r7, supra note 340, at 183; DAWLEY, supra note 341, at 82-88; 1 PHILIP S. FONER,
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 331-33, 354-55 (1947).
353. BORrr, supra note 34o, at 185.
354. STANLEY, supra note 114, at 82 (quoting Godkin); GEORGE A. STEVENS, NEW YORK
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 6: STUDY OF A MODERN TRADE UNION AND ITS PREDECESSORS
243-44 (1913) (quoting Greeley).
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evidence that they - or anyone else - believed that the Thirteenth Amendment
resolved the issue. Had it been mentioned during the debates, the
Amendment's proponents probably would have denied that their proposal had
anything to say about it. Their immediate purpose was to build a solid
constitutional foundation for the abolition of African slavery, and their strategy
in the debates was to avoid specifying rights that might spark controversy. 5 In
particular, members of Congress failed "to examine the imbalances of power in
labor contract bargaining. ,356 No sooner had the Civil War ended, than a
scattering of courts began to revive the doctrine of labor conspiracy.' s Even
northern labor leaders, who routinely charged that prohibitions on striking
amounted to slavery, neglected to invoke the Amendment in support of their
rights claims. Not until a generation later would labor leaders look past the
Amendment's immediate historical purpose and begin to claim its protection
for workers of all colors.
Although this evidence establishes that the Thirteenth Amendment was not
understood to protect the right to strike, it does not show that the Amendment
was understood not to protect the right to strike. We simply do not know how
Congress would have resolved the issue had it been raised. Suppose, for
example, that in response to strikes by freed people (which were common
during the postemancipation period), southern states had made it a crime for
any person to cease work in concert with others for the purpose of coercing an
employer to pay higher wages or provide better conditions." 8 Such a law
would have gone beyond any antistrike law then in effect in the northern
states. 3 9 At that point, there would have been a discussion of the right to strike
just as there actually were discussions of the rights to change employers and set
355. VORENBERG, supra note 20, at 132-33. To the extent that there was substantive discussion, it
was concerned mostly with race and not with the scope of labor rights. Id. at 189-91, 219-20;
TSESIS, supra note 2, at 46, 121.
356. SCHMIDT, supra note 34, at 115.
357. See HATrAM, supra note 337, at 69-70; TOMLINS, supra note 336, at 46-52. Hattam's listing of
cases in Pennsylvania and New York shows three ending in conviction between the years of
1865 and 1870. HATrAM, supra note 336, at 217-18.
358. During this period, employers resorted not to antistrike laws, but to lynchings and armed
attacks by white militias, deputies, and vigilantes. See, e.g., M-ICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, THE
UNION LEAGUE MOVEMENT IN THE DEEP SOUTH: POLrIcs AND AGRICULTURAL CHANGE
DURING RECONSTRUCTION 84 (1989) (observing that Klan violence "demolished the
[Alabama] League as a centralized political entity during early 1868"); see also infra notes
368-370 and accompanying text (recounting black labor organizing and violent white
retaliation during Reconstruction).
359- Even the "Black Laws" passed during the Civil War stopped short of criminalizing the
concerted refusal to work itself. MONTGOMERY, supra note 338, at 98-99.
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one's own wages. Judging from the record of those discussions, Congress
would have focused on the question whether the right to strike was necessary
for the freed people to avoid employer domination and improve their
condition.36o Unfortunately, however, we have no way of knowing how they
would have resolved the issue.
Nor can we draw conclusions from the failure of northern labor to claim
Thirteenth Amendment rights at the time. When a broadly worded provision
is enacted, it may be understood to respond to a particular problem. Arguably,
for example, the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause was meant to prohibit
only prior restraints (and not punishment for speech), and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to ban de jure racial discrimination (but
not segregation) in the limited area of civil rights (and not social or political
rights). In the immediate post-enactment period, it would be "a kind of
trickery" to seize upon the broad language of the provision and apply it outside
its generally understood scope.361 Later, however, the Framers' and Ratifiers'
views on how the amendment applied to the facts of their time -considered in
light of the scholarly and practical knowledge available to them -should give
way to the enacted text. 62 Although the Thirteenth Amendment was initially
applied only to individual market rights, we might come to understand-in
light both of experience and of such social changes as the reversal of the one-
to-eight ratio of employment to self-employment and the rise of the modern
corporation - that involuntary servitude cannot be eradicated unless workers
enjoy the freedom to associate in dealing with employers.
F. Race and the Rights To Organize and Strike
Until the 193os, most American labor unions excluded people of color, and
many conducted strikes to drive black and Asian workers from preferred jobs.
Labor leaders condemned workers of color as "natural" scabs for crossing the
picket lines of unions that excluded them from membership. 6 Andrew
36o. This was their general approach to the threats that did come under discussion. See
VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 453-95.
361. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717,
1753 (2003)-
362. Strauss says that this "would be inconsistent with the original understanding of the
amendment, but consistent with its language." Id. at 1753-54. In line with the terminology
used here, however, it is inconsistent only with the way in which the Framers would have
applied the amendment to the facts of their time.
363. PHILIP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER 1619-1973, at 76, lo9 (1974);
see W.E.B. DuBoiS, THE NEGRO ARTISAN: REPORT OF A SOCIAL STUDY MADE UNDER THE
DIRECTION OF ATLANTA UNIVERSIrY 153-76 (1902); PAUL D. MORENO, BLACK AMERICANS
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Furuseth of the Seamen's Union, the movement's leading Thirteenth
Amendment theorist, defended his union's whites-only rule and urged the
American Federation of Labor to authorize segregated unions.164 In the face of
union hostility, many African-Americans concluded that collective labor rights
impeded black progress. In an 1894 editorial, The Freeman complained that the
Thirteenth Amendment protected union strikers, but if "some poor fellow"
were to fill a position left vacant by a striker, he would be "denounced as a
scab, and he may be stoned or otherwise beaten by strikers. '', 6' Booker T.
Washington promoted black labor as "not inclined to trade unionism" and
"almost a stranger to strife, lock-outs and labor wars.", 66 Relying on
neoclassical economics, some scholars have suggested that this history reflects a
natural tendency for collective labor rights to foster unions that function as job
trusts for the dominant race. 67
For present purposes, however, this history reflects the unremarkable truth
that no right will assist a subordinate group unless the members of that group
are actually permitted to exercise the right. Contrary to Booker T. Washington,
black workers inclined strongly toward unionism and concerted action, but
their employers - typically backed by local and state government - responded
with brutal suppression. Following emancipation, black agricultural laborers
across the South organized and staged strikes to raise wages and establish labor
standards. 68 Beginning in 1868, however, planters and their allies conducted a
ruthless campaign of suppression in the countryside, evicting, flogging, and
killing black activists and their supporters with the aim of destroying all
AND ORGANIZED LABOR: A NEw HISTORY 93-102 (20o6); ROBERT H. ZIEGER, FOR JOBS AND
FREEDOM: RACE AND LABOR IN AMERICA SINCE 1865, at 60-67, 76-81 (2007).
364. 1 THE BLACK WORKER, supra note 1, at 5-6; HYMAN WEINTRAUB, ANDREW FURUSETH:
EMANCIPATOR OF THE SEAMEN 112-13 (1959).
365. The Right To Strike and the Right To Work, THE FREEMAN (Indianapolis), July 21, 1894,
reprinted in 1 THE BLACK WORKER, supra note i, at 81.
366. FONER, supra note 363, at 79.
367. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 7, 53 (2oo1)
(arguing that "in the context of a racist American polity between Reconstruction and the
New Deal," legal protection for strikes and organizing facilitated the efforts of white unions
to exclude black workers from jobs); MORENO, supra note 363, at 4-5 (contending that
"unions have usually acted as 'white job trusts' . . . because unions are, first off all, job
trusts").
368. HEATHER Cox RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS
IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901, at 55-56, 265 n.30 (2001); FITZGERALD, supra
note 358, at 6, 165-69; ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS
LEGACY 91-1o6 (1983).
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manifestations of black organization. 6 ' By 1871, President Isaac Myers of the
Colored National Labor Union reported that organizers could not reach black
workers in some areas "except you are steel-plated against the Ku-Klux bullets"
and despaired of making progress under this "fearful reign of terror."3 70 A
second round of organization, by the interracial Knights of Labor during the
late 188os, met a similar fate. 71 Over the next several decades, sporadic efforts
to organize black farm workers and lumber workers in the South also met with
ferocious suppression.
371
What would have happened if black workers had actually enjoyed the
rights to organize and strike? A hint may be gleaned from the experience in
southern ports. On the New Orleans waterfront, for example, the pattern of
labor organization "ran counter to the dominant trend of black subordination,
exclusion, and segregation" in the 188os and after the turn of the century.
7 3
Why? The leading history suggests that "the strength of black unions was
central in limiting white workers' ability to impose a racially exclusionist
solution on the problems of competition and unemployment." 374 Unlike
individual black workers, black unions could exert strategic pressure on white
unions, punishing racist practices with organized "scabbing" and-more
importantly- rewarding progressive racial policies with anti-scab enforcement
and affirmative support.3 75 This history reveals a positive side to Corwin's
observation that when people "'act in concert, liberty is power.'
376
Organization makes it possible for the members of a subordinate race to
exercise power strategically. Individual black workers might obtain jobs by
underbidding white workers, but norms of racial subordination could not be
weakened until African-Americans -the overwhelming majority of whom were
relatively unskilled laborers -assembled the organizational strength to stand
369. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 95, at 425-44.
370. FONER, supra note 363, at 39.
371. Id. at 58-62; MELTON ALONZA McLAuRIN, THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR IN THE SOUTH 45-51
(1978); Rebecca J. Scott, Fault Lines, Color Lines, and Party Lines: Race, Labor, and Collective
Action in Louisiana and Cuba, 1862-1912, in BEYOND SLAVERY: EXPLORATIONS OF RACE,
LABOR, AND CITIZENSHIP IN POSTEMANCIPATION SOCIETIES 61 (Frederick Cooper, Thomas C.
Holt & Rebecca J. Scott eds., 2000).
372. See FONER, supra note 360, at 118-19, 146-47, 192-93, 207-08 (recounting the demise of
integrated unions of sharecroppers and lumber workers after violence and threats of
violence including the massacre of one hundred Arkansas sharecroppers in 1919).
373. See ERIC ARNESEN, WATERFRONT WORKERS OF NEW ORLEANS: RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS,
1863-1923, at ix (1991).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. CORWIN, supra note 297.
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up openly in the face of white chauvinism. When black sleeping car porters
finally managed to establish the United States' first durable black-led union, it
promptly became a leading force in the struggle for civil rights. Despite its base
in a trade that symbolized servility in the view of whites, the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters provided crucial organizational resources and leadership
for a shift in black politics away from polite and deferential petitioning to
confrontational and righteous protest.' 77
It is undeniably true that associational labor rights can be abused in ways
that conflict with race equality. Accordingly, unions - as well as employers - are
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race. 37s Moreover, mere anti-
discrimination may not be enough; scholars have argued that the labor law
should be reformed so as to remove barriers to union participation and
concerted activity by workers of color.379 The goal of such adjustments,
however, is to ensure that all workers enjoy the benefits of organization and
concerted activity. As in the fields of political rights and market rights, the
sensible response to racist exclusion is inclusion, not withdrawing protection
from the rights at issue.
CONCLUSION
When the black washerwomen of Jackson adopted their scale and
submitted their petition, the Thirteenth Amendment was new and untested.
Most people agreed that the Amendment guaranteed whatever rights were
necessary to negate slavery and involuntary servitude, but there was no
consensus as to what those rights might be. Even the inalienable right to quit
work was vigorously contested in courts and legislatures until 1910, when the
Supreme Court embraced it over a forceful dissent by the great jurist and
Union veteran Oliver Wendell Holmes.38°
Today, the Supreme Court has yet to adopt and apply a standard for
assessing labor rights claims under the Involuntary Servitude Clause. This
Article has argued that one may be found in the leading decision of Pollock v.
Williams, which contains the Court's most thorough discussion of the
37. See BETH TOMPKINS BATES, PULLMAN PORTERS AND THE RISE OF PROTEST POLITICS IN BLACK
AMERICA, 1925-1945, at 11-12 (2001).
378. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(c) (20o6).
379. See, e.g., Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1313 (2002); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the
NLRA. Not!, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 395 (1993).
380. See supra Part I.
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interpretive issues.381 Under Pollock, a claimed right should be protected if it is
necessary to provide workers with the "power below" and employers the
"incentive above" to prevent "a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions
of work. ,382 Although this is not the only conceivable standard, it does fit well
with the text, history, and case law of the Amendment. 383 It calls on legislatures
and courts to make difficult judgments on matters of degree, but no more so
than do the standards routinely applied under other rights guarantees .14 The
absence of any racial element, which might appear dishonest in light of the fact
that most of the leading cases involved workers of color, nevertheless
corresponds to the original meaning and has important advantages from a
doctrinal point of view. In light of the constantly changing and complex nature
of racial categories and hierarchies, a requirement of provable race
discrimination would prevent effective enforcement in a variety of important
contexts. Accordingly, this Article suggests that although race should play a
role in the analysis of involuntary servitude, the Court has not erred in
refraining from requiring proof of race discrimination.
38 ,
The Pollock standard also fits well with the justifications -legal and
philosophical- for the three Thirteenth Amendment labor rights that are most
widely accepted: the rights to quit work, to change employers, and to set the
wages for which one is willing to work. In today's nation of employees, escape
from the employment relation is not a realistic possibility for most
employees., 86 Freedom from involuntary servitude thus hinges on workers
possessing the "power below" to give employers the "incentive above" to
ensure a supply of jobs that rise above servitude-jobs that do not entail "a
harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work."387 If the market
rights to quit, change employers, and name wages do not suffice to accomplish
this result, then additional, nonmarket rights may be necessary. 88
The most prominent nonmarket rights claims have centered on the
workers' freedom of association. Beginning in the nineteenth century,
American workers and unions insisted that they could not avoid servitude
381. As noted above, this idea was proposed by former Solicitor General and Harvard Law
Professor Archibald Cox more than half a century ago. Cox, supra note 7, at 576-77.
382. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
383. See supra Part III.
384. See supra Section IV.B.
385. See supra Part II.
386. See supra Section V.A.
387. See Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18; supra Sections V.B.-C.
388. See supra Section V.D.
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without exercising the rights to organize and engage in concerted activity.
When the issue came to a head in the 1940s and early 195os, the Supreme
Court avoided a square holding while a majority of lower courts rejected the
claimed rights. The opinions in these cases, however, were remarkably
peremptory, failing to consider the claims in light of the text, history, or
purposes of the Amendment. 3s9 Had the courts wished to provide a rationale,
they might have argued that the associational rights to organize and strike,
unlike the market rights to quit and change employers, entail risks of union
tyranny and market inefficiency. However, such policy concerns cannot excuse
avoidance of the question -inevitably posed by the text of the Amendment -
whether the claimed freedom of association is necessary to enable workers to
avoid involuntary servitude. 39 ° Applying the Pollock standard to this question,
there is no shortage of authoritative statements by Congress and the Supreme
Court that, without the rights to organize and engage in concerted activity, the
individual, unorganized worker is "helpless" to deal with employers or to
protect her freedom of labor. The continuing relevance of these conclusions is
supported by a substantial body of economic scholarship and confirmed by
international labor standards and rulings.3 91 Although the available evidence of
original meaning reveals no specific endorsement of the claimed associational
rights, it is consistent with the proposed application of the Pollock principle to
those rights.3 92 Finally, as long as the freedom of association is enjoyed by
workers of all colors, and not solely by a preferred group, the Amendment's
two great thrusts of labor freedom and race equality should pull in the same
direction. When the black washerwomen of Jackson organized their association
and enacted their scale, they were deploying a historically proven means not
only of winning higher wages and better conditions, but also of resisting racial
injustice.3 93
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